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Abstract
The efficient allocation of electronic services is a complex business problem. Cus-
tomers demand electronic services from service providers who supply these services
at a specified quality of service (QoS). Electronic marketplaces provide a platform
on which multiple customers and multiple providers negotiate the allocation of elec-
tronic services. Such marketplaces might be administrated by government authorities
or large corporations who aim at a socially optimal allocation. If, however, the QoS
desired by customers and the QoS offered by providers is private information on both
market sides, it is difficult to design mechanisms that result in an optimal allocation
from the perspective of a social planner. Using a mechanism design framework, this
research studies the allocation of electronic services with private quality informa-
tion. Because private information is present in the analysis, a second-best allocation
mechanism is derived that satisfies incentive compatibility, individual rationality,
and budget balance. The objectives of this research are (i) to develop a double-sided
mechanism for allocating electronic services with private quality information and
(ii) study this mechanism’s efficiency properties in a set of simulation experiments to
demonstrate its usefulness. All experiments imply that the asymptotic efficiency of
the mechanism is bounded away from 100% even for large markets. This finding is
related to the economic concept of informational smallness that arises in this frame-
work. Because demand and supply are characterized by services of distinct quality,
none of the traders become informationally small as the market size increases.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“It’s no good, it’s no good!” says the
buyer – then goes off and boasts about
the purchase.
Proverbs 20:14, The Bible
(New International Version)
1.1 Motivation
The increasing number of third-party vendors offering electronic services has stimu-
lated the growth of information technology (IT) outsourcing in many organizations
(Chang and Gurbaxani, 2012). Firms outsource their applications to these vendors,
who provide access to computing resources at a specified quality of service (QoS)
such as availability, throughput, and execution time (Gartner, 2013). Advances in
IT facilitate the substitution of traditionally static and long-term relationships by
flexible contracts of shorter duration, with Cloud computing being the most recent
manifestation of these advances (Armbrust et al., 2010). To this end, electronic
marketplaces for Cloud services such as the Avnet Cloud Marketplace (2016) have
emerged. These marketplaces might be administrated by government authorities or
1
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large corporations who aim at a socially optimal allocation. For instance, govern-
ment users may demand electronic services from geographically remote data centers
owned by the government (Kundra, 2011). The overall objective of the marketplace
is to serve the customers and to best utilize these data centers.
This research addresses the allocation problem for electronic services with
private information about the QoS. On electronic marketplaces, customers and
providers automatically negotiate the exchange of these electronic services. By as-
signing specific valuations to the demands and offers, each trader can enunciate his
preferences over the allocation of the services. Once all demands and offers are
submitted, the mechanism determines an allocation that maximizes the sum of the
aggregated preferences. However, the design of such mechanisms is difficult because
of the following requirements:
1. Double-sided competition: Electronic marketplaces are platforms that bring to-
gether two distinct groups of users to facilitate their interaction (Eisenmann et al.,
2006). Surplus is generated when the marketplace matches the demand of cus-
tomers with the supply of providers. The emerging double-sided competition
significantly influences the pricing structure offered to the traders (Armstrong,
2006). Therefore, the allocation mechanism proposed by the platform must main-
tain double-sided competition between the traders.
2. QoS awareness: Customers have different requirements for the quality charac-
teristics of the services (Pal and Hui, 2012). Therefore, it is not viable to solely
account for the price of the services as the single attribute. On the other hand, ser-
vice providers use QoS attributes for differentiation from the competition. Hence,
the allocation of electronic service must be predicated on the specific QoS require-
ments of customers and the distinct QoS offers of providers. However, the offered
QoS is typically fixed prior to provider selection (Bichler and Kalagnanam, 2005),
and mechanisms that internalize QoS significantly affect the outcome throughout
the allocation process (Bockstedt and Goh, 2011). Therefore, the desired QoS of
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customers and the actual QoS offered by service providers must be internalized
in the allocation mechanism.
3. Private information: Customers and providers are not capable of perfectly ob-
serving exact information about the demand and supply of QoS on the market.
In fact, each customer’s desired QoS is known only to that customer, and each
provider’s actual QoS is known only to that provider. The mechanism designer
(e.g., a social planner) observes no one’s desired or actual QoS, and no individual
observes the QoS of any other individual. Hence, the mechanism must facilitate
the allocation of electronic services for which any QoS information is unknown.
4. Incentive compatibility: Self-interested customers and providers want to maxi-
mize their own expected utility. They may act strategically when negotiating with
others if this is advantageous to them. Thus, the mechanism has to provide ade-
quate incentives to strategic individuals because they might potentially misreport
their true preferences.
5. Individual rationality: Customers and providers may only participate in the
allocation mechanism if they can expect non-negative utilities from their partici-
pation. If they anticipate negative utility, they will withdraw from the mechanism.
Hence, the mechanism must not force individuals to participate in the allocation
process.
6. Budget balance: The mechanism must omit any independent intermediary in or-
der to facilitate distributed decision-making among the traders (Egri and Va´ncza,
2013). This requirement implies that all payments must be distributed among the
traders.
7. Optimality: The ultimate objective of the mechanism is to achieve an outcome
that is optimal from a social welfare perspective. In an ex post optimal mechanism,
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customers receive the electronic services whenever their valuation for the services
is higher than the cost of the providers (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983).
Standard impossibility theorems from mechanism design theory assert that meet-
ing these requirements simultaneously is not attainable (Laffont and Maskin, 1979;
Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983). In particular, ex post optimality cannot be at-
tained when incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance are
required as well. Therefore, the mechanism designer must determine a viable trade-
off of these requirements. One possible compromise in the presence of privately
known QoS is to derive a second-best mechanism. A second-best mechanism is
the optimal mechanism when private information is present. Unlike first-best mech-
anisms, which are optimal ex post, second-best mechanisms only achieve ex ante
optimality. That is, second-best mechanisms maximize the expected social welfare
subject to incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance. The
outcome of such mechanisms can be used to estimate the efficiency loss that must
be tolerated in comparison to the first-best outcome (Rustichini et al., 1994).
Studying the efficiency properties of such second-best mechanisms in the pres-
ence of private quality information is not possible with current allocation mecha-
nisms. Current approaches for electronic service allocation integrate QoS through
multi-attribute procurement auctions with optimal scoring rules (Che, 1993; Bichler
and Kalagnanam, 2005; Blau et al., 2010) and combinatorial auctions (Zaman and
Grosu, 2013; Karaenke, 2014). However, these models only support competition
either among providers or among customers but not both at the same time. The
allocation mechanism studied by Regev and Nisan (2000) facilitates double-sided
competition but does not explicitly incorporate QoS into the preferences of cus-
tomers and providers. The mechanism proposed by Schnizler et al. (2008) supports
both double-sided competition and QoS integration. Yet their pricing scheme does
not satisfy incentive compatibility. In economic theory, Gresik and Satterthwaite
(1989) propose an allocation mechanism that supports double-sided competition
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with private information. Similar to the approach in this thesis, Gresik and Satterth-
waite derive a second-best mechanism that satisfies incentive compatibility, individ-
ual rationality, and budget balance. However, their model considers the allocation
of identical objects only. Insofar, electronic services of distinct QoS cannot be allo-
cated with their approach. Muthoo and Mutuswami (2005, 2011) study the efficiency
properties of an allocation mechanism with private information about distinct quality
levels of the traded objects. Yet they do not derive the optimal allocation rules or
payments used by the second-best mechanism. Johnson (2013) proposes an optimal
double-sided matching mechanism, in which the matching of the traders is based
on distinct, privately known quality characteristics. Nevertheless, Johnson derives
the optimal matching from the perspective of a profit-maximizing intermediary only.
Hence, the efficiency properties of the corresponding second-best mechanism cannot
be assessed by his approach.
1.2 Research approach
This research studies the allocation of electronic services with private quality infor-
mation from a mechanism design perspective. Mechanism design theory belongs to
the discipline of game theory (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1993). It studies how privately
known preferences of multiple players can be aggregated toward a social choice
(Nisan and Ronen, 2001). In this research, multiple customers demand electronic
services of a specific QoS known to them alone, and multiple providers offer elec-
tronic services at a specific QoS known exclusively by them. The prevalent focus
of this research is on matching markets, in which potential gains from trade depend
on the privately known QoS of the matched customers and providers. Because ex
post optimality is unattainable when incentive compatibility, individual rationality,
and budget-balance are required, this research derives the optimal allocation rules
of a second-best mechanism that maximizes the expected social welfare (i.e., gains
from trade) across all customers and providers. Using the first-best outcome as a
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benchmark, this work studies the efficiency properties of the second-best mecha-
nism subject to incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget-balance.
To identify these optimal rules, this research focuses on direct revelation mecha-
nisms by invoking the revelation principle (Myerson, 1979) in a first step. Second,
the real-world relevance is addressed by implementing the mechanism through a spe-
cific position auction. For instance, position auctions are used by Google and Yahoo
to display search engine ads at positions that are most likely to be clicked on by the
user (Varian, 2007). Third, a set of simulation experiments demonstrates the efficacy
of the proposed mechanism. Thus, the objectives of this research are to (i) develop a
double-sided mechanism for allocating electronic services with privately known QoS
and (ii) evaluate this mechanism in a set of simulation experiments to demonstrate
its usefulness.
Because the social welfare induced by an allocation depends on each trader’s
private quality information, this research draws on matching mechanisms, in which
customers and providers only produce mutual surplus if they are matched together.
Johnson (2013) proposes a double-sided matching mechanism that allocates the
traders based on their private quality information. While the approach examined by
Johnson (2013) focuses solely on mechanisms that maximize the expected profit of
the intermediary, this research studies the efficiency properties of the second-best set
of mechanisms for allocating electronic services from a social welfare perspective.
Therefore, this research extends the work of Johnson (2013) in two directions. First,
instead of maximizing the intermediary’s profit, the proposed mechanism maximizes
the expected social welfare subject to budget balance. Second, the resulting second-
best mechanism is analyzed for its efficiency properties.
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1.3 Overview
This thesis is structured in six chapters. The introduction is followed by a literature-
based analysis of the state of the art. Then the formal model is presented and applied
to the development and evaluation of the allocation mechanism.
Chapter 1 introduces the addressed research problem and provides an overview of
the research approach.
Chapter 2 provides the analysis of the state of the art relevant to this research by
first discussing the basic concepts of mechanism design theory, followed by
inferring a set of requirements on the mechanism. Subsequently, this chapter
analyzes the extant literature with respect to the allocation problem.
Chapter 3 introduces the formal model for studying the QoS-aware allocation of
electronic services supporting double-sided competition under private quality
information.
Chapter 4 presents the allocation mechanism for electronic services with distinct
quality values. The mechanism is examined for its efficiency properties from
a social welfare perspective.
Chapter 5 reports on the experimental evaluation of the proposed allocation mech-
anism. A set of simulation experiments with artificial data is conducted to
provide evidence of the mechanism’s efficacy.
Chapter 6 summarizes the main results and outlines opportunities for future re-
search.
Chapter 2
Analysis of the State of the Art
The simple believe anything, but the
prudent give thought to their steps.
Proverbs 14:15, The Bible
(New International Version)
This chapter presents the analysis of the state of the art with respect to the alloca-
tion of electronic services with private quality information. Grounded on pertinent
fundamentals in mechanism design theory, this chapter derives a set of requirements
that must be fulfilled for solving the addressed problem. Subsequently, this chapter
analyzes extant allocation mechanisms for electronic services in the literature and
assesses to which degree they meet these requirements.
2.1 Mechanism design theory
Mechanism design belongs to the mathematical discipline of game theory, which
analyzes how individual agents behave in a given game setting. In this thesis, the
terms agents and traders are used interchangeably. Mechanism design theory is “a
strategic version of social choice theory, which adds the assumption that agents will
behave so as to maximize their individual payoffs” (Leyton-Brown and Shoham,
8
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2013). It attempts to fashion rules with specific properties to produce a certain
outcome. The following sections introduce the relevant concepts and notations used
in mechanism design theory (Bo¨rgers, 2015; Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1993).
2.1.1 Bayesian mechanisms
Bayesian mechanism design studies the implementation of a mechanism in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. In Bayesian games, the information about the preferences of the
agents is private to these agents and are described by given probability distributions
(Korb and Nicholson, 2010). Bayesian mechanisms induce games of incomplete
information. Specific social choice functions use these the agents’ privately known
preferences to determine an allocation that satisfies a number of desirable proper-
ties. In particular, games induced by mechanisms are analyzed for Bayesian Nash
equilibria. One prominent result in mechanism design theory – the revelation prin-
ciple – provides strong implications on mechanism implementations in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
2.1.1.1 Private information
When some agents do not know the preferences of the others, the game is said to
have private information. Bayesian mechanism design assumes that this private in-
formation follows a set of publicly known probability distributions. This assumption
is referred to as the independent private values assumption (Milgrom and Weber,
1982). In models with independent private values, the private information of each
agent is independent from that of other agents and follows commonly known proba-
bility distributions. An agent’s private information is also known as the agent’s type
in mechanism design theory. Thus, each agent is defined by his type. Let θi ∈ Θi
denote the type of agent ai, where Θi is the associated type space. Let Fi denote
the publicly accessible probability distribution on Θi. In game theory, such settings
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are modeled by games of incomplete information, which were first introduced by
Harsanyi (1967-1968).
Definition 2.1. Following Nisan et al. (2007), a game of incomplete information
with I ∈ N agents is characterized by:
1. For each agent ai, there exists a set of strategies Si. The strategy of ai is a function
si : Θi→ Si, which determines ai’s action based on his type θi ∈Θi.
2. For each agent ai, there exists a set of types Θi, as well as the publicly accessible
probability distribution Fi on Θi. The value θi ∈ Θi is the type (i.e., the private
information) of ai. The quantity Fi(θi) is the probability realization that ai is of
type θi.
3. For each agent ai, there exists a utility function ui : S1×·· ·×SI×Θi→R. Agents
are assumed to be risk neutral. Game theory denotes such utility functions as
quasi-linear because they exhibit linear and separable dependence on money.
In games of incomplete information, each agent must select his strategy based on
his own type θi, not knowing the other agents’ types θ−i =(θ1, . . . ,θi−1,θi+1, . . . ,θI).
The agent only knows the common probability distributions of the other agents’
types. The main goal of mechanism design theory is to implement rules such that
these strategies are in equilibrium. To describe the implementation of these rules,
functions are required that translate the agents’ private information into a collective
choice. These functions are referred to as social choice functions.
2.1.1.2 Social choice functions
Since the preferences of the agents depend on their privately observed types
{θ1, . . . ,θI}, the collective decision itself must be a function of these types. This
social choice function takes as input the types of all the agents and determines an
allocation in Ω, where Ω denotes the set of all possible allocation alternatives.
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Definition 2.2. A social choice function is a function fsc :Θ1×·· ·×ΘI→Ω, which
maps the types (θ1, . . . ,θI) ∈Θ1×·· ·×ΘI of all agents to an allocation in Ω.
A mechanism defines a set of rules that govern the actions of the agents in
games of incomplete information. The rules specify how these actions translate into
a collective allocation outcome. Hence, a mechanism indirectly implements a social
choice function by providing a platform on which the agents interact to make a
collective choice.
Definition 2.3. A mechanism is a tupleM = (S1, . . . ,SI,g(·)), where S1, . . . ,SI are
the strategy sets of the agents and g : S1×·· ·×SI →Ω is an outcome function.
A mechanism induces a game of incomplete information. The outcome function
g specifies the rules for how the actions of the agents translate into a social choice.
The following example illustrates these definitions applied to first-price auctions.
Example 2.1. Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction. This auction is a
mechanism where I agents compete for a single, indivisible good. The agent
proposing the highest bid receives the good and transfers a payment equal
to this bid. Formally, the strategy set of each agent is Si = R+, the set of
all positive real numbers, and, given the individual bids b1, . . . ,bI of each
agent, the outcome function of the mechanism is specified by g(b1, . . . ,bI) =
(y1(b1, . . . ,bI), . . . ,yI(b1, . . . ,bI), t1(b1, . . . ,bI), . . . , tI(b1, . . . ,bI)), where
yi(b1, . . . ,bI) =
1, if and only if i = min{ j : b j = max{(b1, . . . ,bI)}}0, otherwise
denotes the decision variable, and
ti(b1, . . . ,bI) =−bi yi(b1, . . . ,bI)
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defines the payment transferred by the winner.
Because a mechanism induces a game of incomplete information, research in
mechanism design theory is concerned with implementing the social choice function
fsc(·) such that there is an equilibrium of the game that yields the same outcome
as fsc(·) for every possible type vector (θ1, . . . ,θI) ∈ Θ1× ·· ·×ΘI . The standard
solution concept for games of incomplete information is that of a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1993). The following section characterizes the
concept of Bayesian Nash equilibria.
2.1.1.3 Bayesian Nash equilibria
When searching for equilibria in a game of incomplete information, two different
solution concepts can be applied to predict the agents’ strategic behavior: dominant
strategies and Bayesian Nash equilibria. In a dominant strategy mechanism, each
agent’s optimal type announcement is independent of all other agents’ announce-
ments; that is, there exist no publicly known probability distributions whatsoever. In
applications of dominant strategies, the agents emanate from the “worst-case” be-
havior of the other agents. In contrast, implementing social choice functions in the
Bayesian context depends on the realization of the agents’ expected utilities. Since
g : S1×·· ·×SI → Ω is the outcome function, the strategies of the agents translate
into an allocation alternative x ∈Ω. Each agent is assumed to be an expected utility
maximizer, whose quasi-linear utility function is ui(x,θi), given his type θi and an
allocation alternative x ∈Ω. The following definition characterizes Bayesian Nash
equilibria, initially introduced by the seminal work of Harsanyi (1967-1968).
Definition 2.4. The strategy combination s(·) = (s1(·), . . . ,sI(·)) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of mechanismM = (S1, . . . ,SI,g(·)) if, for all θi ∈Θi and all sˆi ∈ Si,
Eθ−i[ui(g(si(θi),s−i(θ−i)),θi)]≥ Eθ−i[ui(g(sˆi,s−i(θ−i)),θi)]. (2.1)
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Hence, the strategy profile s1,s2, . . . ,sI is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if, for
every agent ai and every type θi, strategy si(θi) is the best response of ai to the strate-
gies s−i(θ−i) of all other agents, when ai is of type θi, in expectation over the types
of all other agents Eθ−i[·]. The following definition characterizes the implementation
of a mechanism in the Bayesian sense.
Definition 2.5. The mechanismM = (S1, . . . ,SI,g(·)) implements the social choice
function fsc(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there exists a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium (s1(·), . . . ,sI(·)) such that g(s1(θ1), . . . ,sI(θI)) = fsc(θ1, . . . ,θI) for all types
(θ1, . . . ,θI) ∈Θ1×·· ·×ΘI .
2.1.1.4 The revelation principle
In general, there may be a large set of possible mechanisms that implement a social
choice function. However, the revelation principle states that, in searching for mech-
anisms that implement a social choice function, attention can be restricted to one
class of very simple mechanisms: the direct revelation mechanisms. In a direct reve-
lation mechanism, all agents are induced to directly disclose their types. Then, given
the announced type vector (θˆ1, . . . , θˆI), the mechanism determines an allocation such
that x = fsc(θˆ1, . . . , θˆI).
Definition 2.6. A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism in which Si = Θi
for each agent ai and g(θ1, . . . ,θI) = fsc(θ1, . . . ,θI) for all types (θ1, . . . ,θI) ∈Θ1×
·· ·×ΘI .
A direct revelation mechanism mandates all agents to directly announce their
types to the mechanism. Then, based on the reported types, the mechanism computes
the strategies that each agent would have used in the original mechanism. Finally, the
mechanism implements the outcome function g(·) prescribed in the given game for
these strategies. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983, p. 267-268) informally describe
the main idea of the revelation principle as follows:
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The essential idea is that, given any equilibrium of any bargaining game,
we can construct an equivalent incentive-compatible direct mechanism
by first asking the buyer and seller each to confidentially report his
valuation, then computing what each would have done in the given
equilibrium strategies with these valuations, and then implementing the
outcome (transfer of money and object) as in the given game for this
computed behavior. If either individual had any incentive to lie to us
in this direct mechanism, then he would have had an incentive to lie to
himself in the original game, which is a contradiction of the premise
that he was in equilibrium in the original game.
The following proposition formalizes the revelation principle in the Bayesian
context.
Proposition 2.1 (Bayesian revelation principle). If there exists a mechanismM =
(S1, . . . ,SI,g(·)) that implements the social choice function fsc(·) in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, then fsc(·) is Bayesian incentive compatible.
Proofs of the proposition can be found in the work of Mas-Colell et al. (1995) as
well as that of Fudenberg and Tirole (1993) and are omitted here.
Early versions of the revelation principle were developed by the seminal work
of Gibbard (1973) and further extended by the work of Dasgupta et al. (1979), My-
erson (1979, 1981), Harris and Townsend (1981), and Harris and Raviv (1981). The
revelation principle greatly simplifies the search for mechanisms that implement
social choice functions. Without loss of generality, the mechanism designer can re-
strict attention to direct revelation mechanisms, in which all agents simply announce
their types and, based on these announcements, the mechanism’s outcome function
equals the social choice function. The set of equilibrium outcomes induced by direct
revelation mechanisms are those mechanisms that satisfy incentive compatibility.
Section 2.1.2 further explores the notion of incentive compatibility.
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2.1.2 Desirable mechanism properties
The design objective of a mechanism is to arrive at an efficient allocation with respect
to a set of economically desirable properties. These properties include (i) incentive
compatibility because agents are assumed to act strategically, (ii) individual rational-
ity because participation in the mechanism must be voluntary, (iii) budget balance
because no outside party exists to subsidize the mechanism, and (iv) social welfare
maximizing. This section introduces these properties in the Bayesian context.
2.1.2.1 Incentive compatibility
To determine the optimal equilibrium outcome from all possible mechanisms, this
research adopts the standard approach by invoking the revelation principle. As dis-
cussed in Section 2.1.1.4, attention can be restricted to incentive compatible direct
mechanisms without loss of generality. Thus, if a social choice function is imple-
mentable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, it is also Bayesian incentive compatible
according to the following definition.
Definition 2.7. The social choice function fsc(·) is Bayesian incentive compatible if,
for all types θi ∈Θi, the strategy combination s(·) = (θ1, . . . ,θI) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanismM = (Θ1, . . . ,ΘI, fsc(·)). Thus, for
all θˆi ∈Θi,
Eθ−i[ui( fsc(θi,θ−i),θi)]≥ Eθ−i[ui( fsc(θˆi,θ−i),θi)]. (2.2)
2.1.2.2 Individual rationality
In games of incomplete information, the utilities of the agents are expected utilities.
The expectation of these utility functions crucially depends on the point in time
when the types of the agents are observed by the agents. The literature provides
three evaluation stages to describe the appropriate timing (Holmstro¨m and Myerson,
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1983): ex post, interim, and ex ante. At each stage, there are different expectations
for the agent’s utility function.
In the ex post timing stage of the direct revelation mechanism, all types of the
agents are publicly known to all agents. At this point in time, all types have been
reported to the mechanism and an allocation x ∈ Ω has been selected. In this case,
agent ai’s ex post utility function is given by ui(x,θi), when ai is of type θi. That is,
it is not necessary to take expectations because all type are publicly known.
In the interim timing stage of the direct revelation mechanism, each agent pri-
vately observes his own type but does not know any other agents’ types. In fact, the
other agents’ types are given by publicly known probability distributions. At this
point in time, the agents have not yet reported their types. In this case, agent ai’s
interim utility function evaluates to Eθ−i[ui(x,θi)], when ai is of type θi. Function
Eθ−i takes expectations with respect to all other agents’ types θ−i conditional on ai’s
known type θi.
In the ex ante timing stage of the direct revelation mechanism, the agents know
neither their own type nor the types of any other agents. The agents have not observed
any type but instead rely on the publicly accessible probability distributions. In this
case, agent ai’s ex ante utility function is E[ui(x,θi)], when ai is of type θi. Function
E denotes the expectation with respect to all agents’ types.
These three evaluation stages play a central role in defining the mechanism’s
Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint (2.2). This constraint, however, is not the
only desirable property of the mechanism. The agent participates in the mechanism
only if his expected utility is non-negative. If participation in the mechanism is
voluntary, agent ai’s decision whether to participate must be individually rational.
Hence, imposing an individual rationality constraint on the mechanism is desirable
but may limit the set of social choice functions that can successfully be implemented.
Suppose that agent ai of type θi receives a utility of ui(x,θi) = 0 if he withdraws
from the mechanism with allocation outcome x = fsc(θi,θ−i). This utility is also
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referred to as the outside option of that agent in mechanism design theory. To en-
sure ai’s participation in the mechanism, the individual rationality constraint to be
imposed depends on the current evaluation stage. An agent participates in the mech-
anism only if a non-negative expected utility can be guaranteed. In the ex post stage,
this condition means ui(x,θi)≥ 0; thus, the agent can withdraw from the mechanism
even after all types are publicly known and the final allocation x ∈ Ω is selected.
However, if agent ai is only able to withdraw from the mechanism after all agents
have learned their types but before they report them, then agent ai’s interim indi-
vidual rationality constraint is given by Eθ−i[ui(x,θi)] ≥ 0. Finally, if agent ai can
withdraw only before all agents observe their types, his ex ante individual rationality
criterion is E[ui(x,θi)]≥ 0.
2.1.2.3 Budget balance
As discussed in Example 2.1, allocation mechanisms prescribe monetary payments
that are paid to or received by the agents for taking participation in an allocation.
In general, the mechanism must omit any independent intermediary and facilitate
distributed decision-making among the agents (Egri and Va´ncza, 2013). This re-
quirement implies that all payments must be distributed among the agents, and the
mechanism must raise sufficient revenue from the agents to cover the cost for run-
ning the platform. Game theory denotes this property as budget balance (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1993). In a budget-balanced mechanism, all monetary transfers between
the agents must sum to zero. If this condition does not hold, the mechanism must
be subsidized continuously by a third party. Similar to the individual rationality con-
straint, the budget balance constraint can be imposed at different timing stages (cf.
Section 2.1.2.2). This research focuses on the ex ante budget balance constraint.
Definition 2.8. The social choice function fsc : Θ1 × ·· · × ΘI → Ω satis-
fies ex ante budget balance if the expectation of all monetary transfers
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t1(θ1, . . . ,θI), . . . , tI(θ1, . . . ,θI) made by the agents sums to zero. Thus, for all
(θ1, . . . ,θI) ∈Θ1×·· ·×ΘI ,
E
[ I
∑
i=1
ti(θ1, . . . ,θI)
]
= 0. (2.3)
2.1.2.4 Optimality
The ultimate goal of an allocation mechanism is to satisfy Pareto optimality (Sen,
1970). In a Pareto optimal allocation, it is not possible to increase one agent’s utility
without decreasing the utility of at least one other agent. Pareto optimality and ex
post optimality are often used interchangeably in mechanism design theory.
Definition 2.9. The social choice function fsc :Θ1×·· ·×ΘI→Ω is ex post optimal
if, for no type profile (θ1, . . . ,θI), there is an allocation alternative x ∈ Ω such that
ui(x,θi)≥ ui( fsc(θi,θ−i),θi) for every i, and ui(x,θi)> ui( fsc(θi,θ−i),θi) for some i.
Ex post optimal mechanisms are referred to as first-best mechanisms in the
literature (Bo¨rgers, 2015). Because agents use quasi-linear utility functions, a social
choice function is ex post optimal if it maximizes the sum over all utilities. The sum
over all agents’ utilities is also known as the utilitarian social welfare (Chevaleyre
et al., 2006). Thus, the ultimate design objective is to solve
max
x∈Ω
I
∑
i=1
ui(x,θi), (2.4)
subject to incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance.
However, standard impossibility theorems from mechanism design theory assert
that there is no ex post optimal social choice function that satisfies these require-
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ments simultaneously (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983). Since ex post optimality is
unattainable, research in mechanism design proposes alternative objective functions.
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) seek mechanisms that maximize the ex ante (ex-
pected) social welfare, subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality.
In mechanism design theory, such mechanisms are also known as ex ante efficient
(Rustichini et al., 1994).
Definition 2.10. The social choice function fsc : Θ1 × ·· · ×ΘI → Ω is ex ante
optimal if, for no type profile (θ1, . . . ,θI), there is an allocation alternative x ∈
Ω such that E[ui(x,θi)] ≥ E[ui( fsc(θi,θ−i),θi)] for every i, and E[ui(x,θi)] >
E[ui( fsc(θi,θ−i),θi)] for some i.
Unlike ex post optimality, ex ante optimality only requires the maximization
of the welfare’s expectation across all agent types. This specific objective function
places equal welfare weights on the utilities of the agents. Mechanisms that are ex
ante optimal are known as second-best mechanisms (Bo¨rgers, 2015).
Definition 2.11. A second-best mechanism is one that maximizes the expected
social welfare among all incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms.
Thus, the optimization problem of a second-best mechanism is the maximization
of the expected social welfare, which is given by
max
x∈Ω
E
[ I
∑
i=1
ui(x,θi)
]
, (2.5)
subject to incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance. Cer-
tainly, second-best mechanisms are not socially optimal because ex post optimality
cannot be achieved. However, the outcome of a second-best mechanism can be com-
pared to the outcome of the associated first-best mechanism if it were to exist. To
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compute the outcome of the associated first-best mechanism, one would assume
that all information is publicly given. Then, in the presence of public information,
any incentive compatibility constraints imposed by the mechanism are dropped be-
cause the traders cannot misrepresent their types. Using the first-best outcome as
a benchmark, one can then measure the efficiency of the second-best mechanism.
In particular, the efficiency of the mechanism is defined as the proportion of the
second-best outcome relative to the outcome that the first-best mechanism would
achieve had it existed.
Definition 2.12. Let V denote the outcome of a second-best mechanism and let
V ∗ denote the (socially optimal) outcome of the associated first-best mechanism
if it were to exist. Then the efficiency of the second-best mechanism is defined by
the ratio VV ∗ . The associated asymptotic efficiency is defined as the efficiency of
the mechanism for a market, where the number of participating agents approaches
infinity (Gresik and Satterthwaite, 1989; Rustichini et al., 1994).
With these basic definitions from mechanism design theory in place, a set of
requirements on allocation mechanisms for electronic services can be developed. In
the following section, these requirements are specified in detail.
2.2 Requirements on allocation mechanisms
for electronic services
This section characterizes the set of economic requirements on mechanisms that
must be fulfilled in order to solve the allocation problem. The first three requirements
(double-sided competition, quality awareness, and private information) are due to
the characteristics of electronic services and markets. The last four requirements (in-
centive compatibility, individual rationality, budget balance, and optimality) emerge
from more general characteristics of mechanism design theory (cf. Section 2.1.2).
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2.2.1 Double-sided competition
Electronic services are offered by multiple providers to multiple customers on elec-
tronic marketplaces (e.g., Avnet Cloud Marketplace, 2016). Such marketplaces are
platforms that bring together two distinct groups of users, namely service providers
and service customers (Eisenmann et al., 2006). Value increases as the marketplace
matches demand from both sides. The main challenge of such double-sided market-
places is to choose an appropriate pricing strategy because one side must incorporate
the effects from the other market side’s growth and willingness to pay for the ser-
vices. On double-sided marketplaces, these effects may be either positive or negative.
For instance, increasing the number of customers may be more or less advantageous
for the customers’ side of the market (i.e., same-side effect) or for the providers’ side
of the market (i.e., cross-side effect). Therefore, due to the growing number of cus-
tomers and providers on both market sides, the allocation mechanism for electronic
services must support competition on double-sided marketplaces.
Requirement 1 (Double-sided competition). The allocation mechanism must sup-
port double-sided competition between multiple customers and multiple providers.
2.2.2 Quality awareness
The growth of information and communication technology has significantly influ-
enced the way electronic services are developed and provided. Even though the
concept of electronic services has been discussed extensively in research literature,
there is no agreement regarding a common definition (Gadrey, 2000; Lindgrena and
Jansson, 2013). In particular, business services that use electronic networks as an
infrastructure are referred to as electronic services. Here, the concept of a “service”
is restricted to software services (Papazoglou, 2008); that is, electronic services are
software services provided over electronic networks (Rust and Kannan, 2002).
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Customers of electronic services rely on service providers to supply the appro-
priate computing needs (Buyya et al., 2009). They expect a certain quality from
providers, control in transactions, and a certain level of variety in the choice of
service settings. Such quality attributes represent customer expectations with re-
spect to the demanded electronic service. These qualitative service characteristics
are referred to as quality of service (QoS). The QoS belongs to the class of non-
functional properties of an electronic service and describes how the service performs
(O’Sullivan et al., 2002). These non-functional service properties include measur-
able qualitative characteristics such as availability and throughput. In contrast to a
service’s non-functional properties, its functional properties specify what the service
actually does; that is, the actions the service performs as well as the valid inputs and
outputs of the service. Electronic services that exhibit identical functional properties
are denoted standardized electronic services. The OASIS consortium has recently
promoted the industrial standardization of electronic services in Cloud computing
settings (OASIS, 2016).
This research focuses on non-functional properties associated with standardized
electronic services. In particular, each service is characterized by its quality. Typi-
cally, this QoS comprises a set of quantifiable and measurable QoS parameters. In
this research, each electronic service is described by a single QoS parameter, which
determines the qualitative characteristics of the service. Thus, QoS is modeled as a
one-dimensional parameter.
Requirement 2 (Quality awareness). The allocation mechanism must internalize
the QoS desired by customers and the QoS offered by providers.
2.2.3 Private information
The exact realization of the QoS desired by a customer is private to the customer
and cannot be observed by any other agent. Similarly, the actual QoS offered by a
provider is private to that provider and remains unknown to other agents (Bhargava
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and Sun, 2008). For instance, customers may have imperfect knowledge about QoS
actually delivered by providers and cannot discern low and high quality providers.
On the other hand, providers might be unaware of the current QoS needs of cus-
tomers. Such mutual uncertainty concerning QoS entails negative business conse-
quences (Bazerman and Gillespie, 1999). However, service providers can exploit
QoS uncertainties to induce customers to choose the appropriate QoS. In such set-
tings, high-quality customers pay a higher price for the electronic service. At the
same time, service providers use differentiated QoS levels to distinguish themselves
from their competitors and to create a higher value for the electronic service (Papa-
zoglou, 2008). Therefore, the QoS demanded by customers and the QoS offered by
providers must be represented as private information in the mechanism.
Requirement 3 (Private information). The allocation mechanism must account for
private information about the QoS desired by customers and the QoS offered by
providers.
2.2.4 Incentive compatibility
When strategic agents negotiate over electronic services, the allocation mechanism
must provide adequate incentives to motivate truthful behavior among the agents.
In settings with private information about the QoS, an allocation mechanism is
Bayesian incentive compatible if honest type declaration is a Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium for all customers and providers (cf. Section 2.1.2.1).
Requirement 4 (Incentive compatibility). The allocation mechanism must satisfy
incentive compatibility for all customers and providers.
2.2.5 Individual rationality
Customers and providers only participate in the mechanism if they derive non-
negative utility from participation. They refuse to participate in any allocation
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mechanism if their expected utility is negative. Therefore, the allocation mecha-
nism must ensure that participation in the mechanism is voluntary to that agent (cf.
Section 2.1.2.2).
Requirement 5 (Individual rationality). The allocation mechanism must satisfy in-
dividual rationality for all customers and providers.
2.2.6 Budget balance
On markets for trading electronic services, no external source of funds exists that
is willing to permanently subsidize the platform. Instead, the underlying allocation
mechanism must facilitate distributed decision-making by dispensing all monetary
transfers among the agents. Thus, payments and compensations must offset each
other. The allocation mechanism satisfies budget balance if all monetary transfers
sum to zero for all agents (cf. Section 2.1.2.3). If a mechanism does not fulfill
budget balance, it requires an external net source of funds to continually subsidize
the allocation mechanism. A budget-balanced mechanism does not run a permanent
monetary deficit but is independent of any external source of funds. Therefore, all
allocation mechanisms require budget balance.
Requirement 6 (Budget balance). The allocation mechanism must satisfy budget
balance.
2.2.7 Optimality
Ex post optimality cannot be achieved if incentive compatibility, individual rational-
ity, and budget balance are required (cf. Section 2.1.2.4). Because private informa-
tion is present, this research derives a second-best mechanism, which maximizes the
expected social welfare, subject to incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and
budget balance. Hence, the objective function of the mechanism is the maximization
of the expected social welfare.
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Requirement 7 (Optimality). The allocation mechanism must be ex ante optimal;
that is, it must maximize the expected social welfare.
On the basis of these requirements, the following section presents the analysis of
pertinent mechanisms in the literature that are closely akin to the work in this thesis.
This analysis lays the foundation for the design of any allocation mechanism that
attempts to satisfy the requirements elaborated in this section.
2.3 Analysis of allocation mechanisms
for electronic services
This section analyzes extant allocation mechanisms for electronic services that are
closely related to the mechanism proposed in this thesis. These mechanisms are
divided into five different groups to provide a fundamental demarcation between
the requirements derived in Section 2.2. Each group is defined by pairing together
the salient mechanism requirements of double-sided competition, quality aware-
ness, incentive compatibility, and optimality. Within each group, every allocation
mechanism is analyzed in four steps. First, the formal model of the mechanism is
described. Second, the findings reported for the mechanism are summarized. Third,
the assumptions that underlie the model and its limitations are identified. Finally, the
applicability and the relevance for this thesis are discussed.
2.3.1 Single-sided, quality-aware
This section provides an analysis of three single-sided mechanisms for allocating
electronic services that maintain quality awareness. While the first two approaches
by Che (1993) and Bichler and Kalagnanam (2005) consider multidimensional auc-
tions from the perspective of a profit-maximizing intermediary, Blau et al. (2010)
focus on quality-aware mechanisms that maximize the social welfare.
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Design competition through multidimensional auctions
Among the first auction models to integrate both price and quality is the multidi-
mensional auction model proposed by Che (1993). This model is based on prior
research in information economics (Dasgupta and Spulber, 1990). A single customer
announces a publicly known scoring rule to multiple providers who compete to
win the auction. Price and quality preferences are aggregated in the utility func-
tion of each agent. Che takes the standard approach in mechanism design theory
by invoking the revelation principle to identify the optimal mechanism. Using the
associated optimal outcome as a benchmark, Che studies the indirect mechanism
implementation through three distinct auction formats. In the first-score auction,
each provider submits a bid and, upon winning, delivers the offered quality at the
offered price. In the second-score auction, the winner must match the second-highest
score in the auction. In the second-preferred-offer auction, the winner must match
the exact quality-price combination of the second-highest score. Che studies the
performance of these different auction formats in favor of the profit-maximizing cus-
tomer. Subsequently, he analyzes the optimal quality choice of the winning provider
under alternative auction formats. Branco (1997) extends Che’s work by integrating
correlated cost types of the providers into the auction mechanism.
Che (1993) finds that the performance of the three different auction formats
critically depends on the customer’s design of the scoring rule and his commitment
power. If the customer chooses a scoring rule that reflects his true utility (i.e., the
naive scoring rule), then all three auction formats result in the same expected utility
to the customer. Che also finds that the naive scoring rule leads to excessive quality
under first- and second-score auctions. This result implies that the customer has an
incentive to deviate from the naive scoring rule. The magnitude of this deviation cor-
responds to the quality distortion identified by the revelation principle. Consequently,
Che derives the optimal scoring rule that counterbalances the excessive quality ap-
pearing in the naive scoring rule. Hence, the optimal scoring rule systematically
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discriminates against quality. Finally, Che finds that the first- and second-score auc-
tion can implement the optimal outcome, while the second-preferred auction cannot.
The study of Che (1993) is based on the following assumptions. Although Che
identifies the optimal mechanism for allocating objects of distinct quality levels, the
mechanism assumes a single customer on the market. It remains unclear to what
extent the optimal scoring rule must be adapted once multiple customers enter the
market. Moreover, private information exists only on the providers’ side of the mar-
ket. For this reason, each provider’s cost is a function of the private cost information
and the offered quality parameter. How the existence of private information on the
customer side of the market affects the optimal mechanism definition cannot be
assessed by the model. Finally, Che’s model is not instantiated in an experimental
evaluation.
Although the study of Che (1993) assumes single-sided markets, it presents one
of the first auctions to make the quality of the traded object an intrinsic part of the
mechanism. Since then, much of the succeeding research has built upon scoring rules
for aggregating multiple attributes such as price and quality (Asker and Cantillon,
2008). With respect to this thesis, it is crucial that Che invokes the revelation prin-
ciple for identifying the optimal scoring rule (cf. Section 2.1.1.4). As a result, Che
finds that in the optimal revelation mechanism, quality is distorted downward to limit
the information rents of providers. This finding is important for understanding the
strategic behavior of the agents in this thesis. Here, the definition of a provider’s vir-
tual cost captures the fact that providers have an incentive to overstate their true cost
in order to raise the transaction price. Because Che assumes single-sided competi-
tion, however, the influence that customers can exert on the price cannot be assessed.
Thus, this thesis drops the assumption of single-sided competition by defining a
virtual valuation that reflects the strategic behavior of customers (cf. Section 4.1.1).
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Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions
Specific auctions for the procurement of electronic services with multiple attributes
have also been studied. Instead of awarding the winning contracts to a single provider
(as in the model by Che (1993)), Bichler and Kalagnanam (2005) extend the so-called
sole sourcing auction format to the case of multiple sourcing. Multiple sourcing auc-
tion formats support the allocation of the customer’s demand to multiple providers.
On the other hand, Bichler and Kalagnanam study the configurability of the bids
in multi-attribute auctions. Configurable offers enable providers to specify multiple
QoS attributes and price information for each attribute. Bichler and Kalagnanam
focus on winner determination problems that arise in multi-attribute auctions with
multiple sourcing and configurable offers. For describing these winner determina-
tion problems, they define scoring functions based on the preferences of a customer.
Thus, each possible configuration of a provider’s configurable offer is reflected in a
function of price per quantity and QoS attributes. The pricing scheme of the alloca-
tion mechanism is based on additive pricing functions, where the price dependence
on an attribute is specified as a markup over a fixed base price. In a set of numerical
simulations, Bichler and Kalagnanam study the complexity properties and computa-
tional issues of the different winner determination problems, which arise from the
associated allocation setting with configurable offers. Their model is instantiated
in a numerical simulation by executing the artifact with artificial data. In fact, an
implementation of the associated Multidimensional Auction Platform (MAP) has
been used in a large-scale procurement marketplace for the retail industry (Bichler
et al., 2002).
Bichler and Kalagnanam (2005) find that the winner determination problem
can be solved with typical attribute configurations in the order of a few seconds
by using a branch-and-bound approach. However, imposing additional constraints
on the minimum number of winning providers results in an exponential runtime
for the allocation problem. In particular, they find that the allocation problem of
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configurable offers is considerably easier to solve without homogeneity constraints.
Homogeneity constraints can be imposed on the winner determination problem to
enforce homogeneity of a certain QoS attribute in the set of winning bids. Their
findings indicate that if homogeneity constraints are not considered, the overall win-
ner determination problem can be divided in a set of smaller problems, in which the
optimal configuration for each configurable offer is selected based on a customer’s
scoring function. Again, Bichler and Kalagnanam find that imposing homogeneity
constraints for configurable offers leads to computational infeasibility.
The approach of Bichler and Kalagnanam (2005) is subject to the following
assumptions. While Bichler and Kalagnanam focus on formulating the winner deter-
mination for their allocation problem, they assume a scoring rule that is fixed prior
to the allocation process. Taking the scoring rule as given by the customer, however,
does not allow for assessing the optimality of the allocation outcome. In particu-
lar, their formal model does not provide sufficient constructs to analyze incentive
compatibility or individual rationality. Thus, it remains unclear to what extent the
suggested pricing rules entail truthful behavior of the agents. Moreover, similar to
Che (1993), the model of Bichler and Kalagnanam is limited to a single customer,
which is why their approach cannot be used to examine double-sided competition.
Although the mechanism studied by Bichler and Kalagnanam assumes payment
schemes for which incentive compatibility and individual rationality are not assessed,
their mechanism is relevant to the mechanism developed in this thesis because Bich-
ler and Kalagnanam formulate the allocation problem as a constrained optimization
problem. Constrained optimization for multi-attribute auctions has been used in sub-
sequent research to study clearing algorithms in double auctions (Engel et al., 2006)
as well as the preference-based selection of configurable web services (Lamparter
et al., 2007). Both studies successfully model the winner determination problem
as an optimization problem subject to a set of multi-attribute feasibility constraints.
This thesis embraces this approach by representing the mechanism’s optimality crite-
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rion as a constrained optimization problem. However, in order to facilitate payments
that satisfy incentive compatibility and individual rationality, the optimization prob-
lem must be extended by additional constraints. These constraints must not only
ensure the feasibility of the optimization problem (as in the work of Bichler and
Kalagnanam). In fact, they must also guarantee that the payment schemes satisfy
incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Therefore, the mechanism devel-
oped in this thesis drops the assumption of non-existing constraints for incentive
compatibility and individual rationality by imposing additional constraints that en-
sure incentive compatible and individually rational payments (cf. Section 3.6).
A multidimensional procurement auction for trading composite services
A particular scenario of electronic service allocation is the allocation of services that
are part of a composite service. A composite service is the assembly and invocation
of multiple pre-existing, standardized services, possibly offered by diverse providers
to complete the functionality of a multi-step business process (Papazoglou, 2008).
For this reason, research in multidimensional procurement auctions is concerned
with trading composite electronic services (Blau et al., 2009, 2010). In contrast to
providing traditional service bundles, the provision of a complex composite service
highly depends on the accurate execution order of each service component and only
generates value for the customer if these components occur in a valid sequence.
Traditional negotiation mechanisms such as combinatorial auctions and their ap-
propriate protocol implementation are not sufficient to reach the desired service
allocation. Thus, Blau et al. (2010) study a mechanism that forms the demanded
complex service through the allocation and pricing of individual service components.
Their model is informed by prior research in algorithmic mechanism design (Nisan
and Ronen, 2001). For a composite service, the valuation of each service requester
highly depends on the accurate sequence of its functional parts. Hence, these com-
posite services only generate value through a valid order of their components. To
capture the preferences of customers regarding the different QoS, Blau et al. (2010)
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draw from the work of Asker and Cantillon (2008) and use scoring functions to map
multiple attributes to a single scoring value. The allocation of service components
is computed based on the scoring value for QoS demands of the customer. The pro-
posed mechanism is individually rational for service providers, and the resulting
allocation maximizes the social welfare across all agents. The proposal supports
incentive compatibility with respect to QoS characteristics and prices in weakly
dominant-strategy implementations for all service providers. Using an experimental
evaluation, Blau et al. (2010) study a set of alternative strategies service providers
might pursue by forming strategic coalitions among the providers.
Blau et al. (2010) find that bundling strategies due to coalition formation lead to
a significantly higher expected payoff for less competitive service providers. These
providers offer their services at high prices or at QoS levels that are not sufficiently
valuable for customers. In this way, such providers can combine their offers with
more attractive components offered by other providers in order to increase their
chance of being allocated and the expected payoff. In contrast, competitive service
providers tend to form coalitions with less competitive service providers. Blau et al.
find that customers might view their offers as less favorable although the provision
costs of providers can be reduced by coalition formation. This risk results in a
reduced likelihood of being allocated.
The study of Blau et al. (2010) makes the following assumptions for the proposed
mechanism. Although Blau et al. design an allocation mechanism for electronic
services with QoS attributes from the perspective of a social planner (i.e., a social
welfare maximizer), the mechanism does not satisfy budget balance. Thus, a third
party must permanently subsidize the mechanism in order to maintain its operation.
Further, the mechanism assumes a single customer on the market, who is demanding
services from multiple service providers. Thus, competition can be realized among
service providers alone.
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Although the allocation mechanism presented by Blau et al. (2010) assumes
a market with a single customer, it is relevant to the approach taken in this thesis
because Blau et al. focus on maximizing the social welfare instead of the customer’s
profit (as in Bichler and Kalagnanam (2005)). Hence, they introduce a social choice
by allocating the demanded services from multiple self-interested providers. Subse-
quent mechanisms for allocating electronic services embrace this concept by repre-
senting the objective function of the mechanism in terms of a welfare maximization
function (Haas et al., 2013). This thesis adopts this approach by defining the mech-
anism’s objective function as the sum of all agents’ utilities (cf. Section 3.6). In
Blau et al. (2010), each provider’s internal cost structure and QoS is known only to
that provider. For this reason, the types of the providers are used to internalize these
private costs and QoS into the allocation mechanism. In order to support multiple
competing customers, however, the model presented in this thesis must not only
integrate the providers’ private information concerning their offered QoS. Instead,
it is necessary to represent the QoS desired by customers as private information
also, thus making the privately known QoS an intrinsic part of the mechanism (cf.
Section 3.2).
2.3.2 Single-sided, approximately socially optimal
This section analyzes two single-sided mechanisms that focus on approximating the
socially optimal allocation outcome. Although the approach of Zaman and Grosu
(2013) respects quality awareness to some extent, the requirements of individual
rationality and budget balance cannot be assessed. In contrast, the mechanism pro-
posed by Karaenke (2014) guarantees individual rationality and budget balance but
does not internalize quality as an intrinsic part of the mechanism.
CHAPTER 2. ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF THE ART 33
Combinatorial auction-based allocation of virtual machine instances in Clouds
Zaman and Grosu (2013) study combinatorial auction mechanisms for allocating
instances of virtual machines (VM) in Cloud computing. A VM abstracts the un-
derlying physical computing resources from the customers by providing the VM
as an electronic service of a specific QoS (e.g., storage size). The work of Zaman
and Grosu (2013) is based on prior research in information systems (Archer et al.,
2005; Lehmann et al., 2002). In their model, multiple customers demand instances
of different types of VM offered by a single Cloud provider. To allocate VM, two
distinguished mechanisms are proposed. The first mechanism, namely CA-LP, ex-
tends the work of Archer et al. (2005) by allowing customers to demand more than
one VM instance of a given type. The winner determination problem is represented
in the form of a linear program. The second mechanism, namely CA-GREEDY, is
informed by the approach of Lehmann et al. (2002), which determines the alloca-
tion of VM instances based on the valuations of the customers and the total number
of instances they demand. In the CA-GREEDY mechanism, the final allocation is
approximated by a heuristic that implements a greedy algorithm. Zaman and Grosu
(2013) advance this approach by integrating the relative sizes of the VM instances
and show that the efficiency properties of the original mechanism continue to hold in
the extended mechanism. With regard to the economic properties of their allocation
outcome, they analyze both mechanisms for incentive compatibility. To verify the
allocation efficiency achieved by these mechanisms, a simulation-based comparison
with a real-world fixed-price mechanism is reported.
By analyzing the monotonicity properties of the proposed algorithms, Zaman and
Grosu (2013) find that both CA-LP and CA-GREEDY induce customers to report
their valuation for VM instances truthfully in expectation. In mechanism design the-
ory, monotonicity properties are commonly used to establish incentive compatibility
of a given mechanism. To this effect, the incentive compatibility constraints derived
in this thesis critically depend on similar monotonicity properties (cf. Section 4.1.2
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and Section 4.2.2). The model of Zaman and Grosu (2013) is instantiated in a simula-
tion study by executing the artifact with artificial data. The associated experimental
results indicate that both CA-LP and CA-GREEDY outperform the fixed-price mech-
anism in terms of resource utilization, generated revenue, and allocation efficiency.
In particular, the CA-LP yields the highest revenue across all experiments. Because
the linear program has to be solved repetitively, CA-LP is practically infeasible for a
large number of customers. Instead, CA-GREEDY provides a reasonable alternative
for Cloud computing settings with many customers.
The approach of Zaman and Grosu (2013) is subject to the following assump-
tions. Both allocation mechanisms CA-LP and CA-GREEDY are restricted to a
single Cloud provider. In particular, whether the proven incentive compatibility of
CA-LP and CA-GREEDY continues to hold when multiple Cloud providers enter
the market remains an open question. From a mechanism design perspective, their
model does not provide sufficient constructs to assess individual rationality or bud-
get balance properties. In particular, their work does not provide results regarding
the asymptotic efficiency of CA-GREEDY’s approximated outcome relative to the
outcome achieved by the optimal allocation.
Although the study of Zaman and Grosu (2013) is based on these assumptions, it
is relevant to the mechanism in this thesis because Zaman and Grosu focus on allo-
cating VM instances that have differentiated quality characteristics. These electronic
services are valued differently by each provider. This thesis adopts this concept by
defining the customers’ valuations and the providers’ costs as functions of their dif-
ferentiated QoS demands and offers (cf. Section 3.2.2). Moreover, the CA-GREEDY
mechanism by Zaman and Grosu determines the final allocation of VM instances by
first ranking the customers by their valuation in decreasing order and then allocating
them from top to bottom. In this thesis, a similar ranking technique can be used to
determine the optimal matching between customer and providers by employing the
concept of positive assortative matching (cf. Section 4.2.1). In order to determine
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the second-best mechanism that satisfies incentive compatibility, however, this as-
sortative matching technique must be extended by imposing appropriate constraints
that ensure incentive compatibility. Imposing such constraints results in a truncated
positive assortative matching mechanism that entails truthful behavior of customers
and providers (cf. Section 4.2.1).
Multiagent resource allocation in service networks
Karaenke (2014) studies the problem of allocating interdependent software services
in agent-based multi-tier service networks. Multiple customer agents demand soft-
ware services from multiple service provider agents that must reach agreements by
negotiation. The proposed multi-tier resource allocation mechanism ensures that
agreements are either established with the customer agents and with respective sup-
plier agents in all tiers, or no agreements are established at all. The approach takes
an interaction protocol engineering perspective from multiagent systems research
(Huget and Koning, 2003) and uses models and methods from game theory (Parsons
and Wooldridge, 2002) to study the mechanism properties. The resulting negoti-
ation mechanism specifically avoids overcommitment by provider agents and is
incentive compatible for a single customer agent demand. In addition, it constitutes
a polynomial time heuristic for the social welfare maximization problem. Under
the assumption that resources are non-substitutable between service providers, the
mechanism arrives at a socially optimal allocation for single customer demands. The
model of Karaenke (2014) is instantiated in a simulation study by executing the
artifact with artificial data. He reports on a simulation study with and without sub-
stitutable resources where provider agents make decisions regarding the use of their
own resources or the procurement of sub-services from provider agents in the next
tier (in the case of substitutable resources). In particular, Karaenke (2014) studies
the mechanism’s efficiency for three distinct bidding policies: Providers either offer
their internal resources first, external resources first or they offer best price resources
only. The simulation study compares these three bidding policies by introducing
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the concept of the utility ratio. Utility ratios can be used to measure the overall
efficiency of an approximated or second-best mechanism. This efficiency measure
is defined as the ratio between the outcome of the second-best mechanism divided
by the outcome of the optimal mechanism if it were to exist. Here, the outcome of
the mechanism is defined as the sum of all utilities.
Using a game-theoretic framework, Karaenke (2014) finds that Nash equilib-
ria exist for the optimal allocation of software services in multi-tier service net-
works. The underlying allocation mechanism is found to satisfy individual rational-
ity and budget balance. For single customer demands, Karaenke (2014) finds that
the proposed mechanism always arrives at the socially optimal allocation, given that
resources are non-substitutable among providers. Once the number of customers
increases and providers offer their external resources first, the efficiency of the mech-
anism is about 90% for substitutable resources. For non-substitutable resources, the
efficiency of the mechanism decreases as the number of provider tiers increases.
This finding suggests that the growing allocation complexity and solution space has
a negative impact on the efficiency of the allocation mechanism. From a computa-
tional tractability perspective, it is found that computing socially optimal allocations
is NP-complete.
The approach of Karaenke (2014) is based on the following assumptions. Al-
though the proposed game-theoretic model facilitates the study of the economically
desirable properties in service networks, it lacks the integration of two fundamental
requirements that are necessary for the allocation of electronic services. First, the ap-
proach assumes single-sided competition on the market. In particular, the proposed
mechanism does not satisfy incentive compatibility once additional customers enter
the market. Second, Karaenke makes the assumption that merely homogeneous ser-
vices are allocated by the mechanism. Thus, his model does not explicitly integrate
the differentiated QoS desired by customers and offered by providers. The latter is
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in contrast to Zaman and Grosu (2013), who focus on electronic services of distinct
QoS characteristics.
Although Karaenke’s study is subject to these assumptions, it is relevant to this
thesis because Karaenke uses the notion of utility ratios to measure the performance
of the mechanism relative to the optimal allocation outcome. However, utility ra-
tios are useful only if an optimal mechanism exists and is computationally feasible.
Sandholm (2002) reports that determining the winners of combinatorial auction
mechanisms is generally NP-complete. In this thesis, the winner determination prob-
lem is not NP-hard. Nonetheless, standard impossibility theorems from mechanism
design prevent the existence of ex post optimal mechanisms that satisfy incentive
compatibility and individual rationality (cf. Section 2.1.2.4). Therefore, unlike the
mechanism of Karaenke, the mechanism proposed in this thesis is a second-best
mechanism (cf. Section 3.6). Using the concept of utility ratios, the outcome of
the second-best mechanism is compared to the outcome of the associated optimal
mechanism if it were to exist. To obtain the outcome of the (non-existing) optimal
mechanism in this thesis, the constraints on incentive compatibility and individual
rationality are dropped. Then the efficiency of the mechanism is calculated as the
ratio between the second-best and first-best outcome.
2.3.3 Double-sided, quality-unaware
This section focuses on two allocation mechanisms that support double-sided com-
petition but do not internalize differentiated QoS. The first approach is concerned
with mechanisms that face a tradeoff between incentive compatibility and optimality
(Regev and Nisan, 2000). The second mechanism, presented by Gresik and Satterth-
waite (1989), is a second-best mechanism that satisfies Bayesian incentive compati-
bility, individual rationality, and budget balance.
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The POPCORN market – an online market for computational resources
Regev and Nisan (2000) study a set of market-based mechanisms for trading central
processing unit (CPU) cycles across the Internet. CPU cycles of idle processors are
offered as electronic services, whose QoS is specified by the number of available
CPU cycles. In the electronic market studied by Regev and Nisan (2000), multiple
customers demand CPU cycles, while multiple providers offer CPU cycles at a
specific price. Their model is based on prior research in market-based resource
allocation (Waldspurger et al., 1992). In their work, the market itself is responsible
for matching customers and providers according to economic criteria. The two main
design goals of the system are to implement economically efficient allocations by
maximizing the global utility and to motivate customers and providers to reveal
their true utility of the CPU cycles. The model of Regev and Nisan is instantiated
in a simulation study by executing the artifact with artificial data. In this study,
they focus on three distinct sealed-bid mechanisms. First, they consider a repeated
Vickrey auction where the price paid by the customer corresponds to the second
highest price offered in the auction (Vickrey, 1961). Second, they study a simple
double auction where customers and providers offer lower and upper bounds of a
price. This auction is similar to the simultaneous execution of two first-price sealed
bid auctions (Milgrom, 2004). Each provider places an offer at a high price, which
is then automatically decreased at a given rate until a customer is found. Similarly,
each customer submits a low price, which is then automatically increased at a given
rate until a provider is found. Third, Regev and Nisan study a repeated clearinghouse
double auction that calculates the demand and supply curves and sets the equilibrium
price at fixed time intervals. Every transaction in the current round uses the same
equilibrium price. For each mechanism implementation, Regev and Nisan study the
asymptotic efficiency and the price stability of the associated allocation outcome.
Furthermore, their model has been implemented and was operable for over one year
through a website (POPCORN project, 1998).
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Regev and Nisan (2000) find that the clearinghouse mechanism achieves an
efficiency of about 96%. The repeated Vickrey auction and the simple double auction
decrease in efficiency, falling below 85% and 70%, respectively. This finding shows
the effect of the concurrency of these two auction formats on the allocation efficiency.
Low-cost providers who arrive later cannot be matched to high-valued customers
anymore because they have left the market already. The opposite applies to expensive
providers. In terms of price stability, Regev and Nisan find that transaction prices
generated by the clearinghouse auction are more stable than those from other auction
formats. Regarding the probability of trade, their findings confirm that high offers
of customers and low prices of providers lead to an increased probability of trade in
all three auction formats.
The study of Regev and Nisan makes the following assumptions on the proposed
mechanism implementations. First, Regev and Nisan do not explicitly internalize
differentiated QoS in the mechanism. Thus, their model cannot be readily used to
analyze mechanisms in which traders demand and offer services of distinct QoS.
Second, although the single-round Vickrey auction is incentive compatible (even
in dominant strategies), incentive compatibility does not necessarily hold if it is
executed repeatedly. Furthermore, the repeated Vickrey auction does not support
competition among the providers. In contrast, the simple double auction supports
(Bayesian) incentive compatibility among both customers and providers. However, it
does not necessarily arrive at the socially optimal allocation. Lastly, because Regev
and Nisan assume multi-unit resources, the clearinghouse double auction is not
incentive compatible.
Although the three allocation mechanisms studied by Regev and Nisan (2000) are
subject to these assumptions, they are relevant to the approach pursued in this thesis
because Regev and Nisan’s clearinghouse double auction also uses a single-round
matchmaking mechanism to determine the optimal allocation. In order to obtain a
mechanism that integrates differentiated QoS on both market sides, however, this
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matchmaking mechanism must internalize these differentiated QoS characteristics.
Therefore, this thesis drops the assumption of homogeneous QoS by defining an
allocation rule that matches customers and providers based on the reported bids
about their differentiated QoS demands and offers. This modification ensures that
the mechanism matches the right pairs of customers and providers, thus eliciting the
highest possible match surplus (cf. Section 4.2.1).
The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of
traders increases: an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) study the replication of the bilateral model proposed
by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) to allow for multiple customers and providers
with double-sided private information. Customers and providers exchange identical
objects based on privately known reservation values. Using a mechanism design
framework, Gresik and Satterthwaite characterize the set of all allocation mecha-
nisms that satisfy incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Because ex post
optimality is not attainable by the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem,
Gresik and Satterthwaite construct an ex ante optimal mechanism. In their work, an
ex ante efficient mechanism is one that places equal welfare weights on every trader
and maximizes the sum of the traders’ ex ante expected utilities subject to incentive
compatibility and individual rationality. Gresik and Satterthwaite provide conditions
sufficient for the existence of ex ante efficient mechanisms and study specific con-
vergence properties of these mechanisms as the market size increases. In particular,
they determine the rate at which the ex ante optimal mechanism converges to ex post
optimality as a function of the market size. The model of Gresik and Satterthwaite
is instantiated in a numerical example, which illustrates the convergence properties
of the ex ante optimal mechanism for an increasing market size up to twelve traders.
Finally, Gresik and Satterthwaite compare the efficiency properties of the optimal
mechanism to those of a fixed-price mechanism.
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Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) find that their characterization of all incentive
compatible and individually rational mechanisms in the multilateral model general-
izes the results obtained in the bilateral trading model of Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983). The numerical example for uniformly distributed reservation values shows
that the bilateral model achieves an efficiency of 84.36%. These inefficiencies dis-
appear with increasing market size. In the limit market, as the number of customers
and providers approaches infinity, the mechanism converges to perfect competition;
that is, ex post efficiency is achieved. Gresik and Satterthwaite also provide an upper
bound on the relative inefficiency of the mechanism. For the fixed-price mechanism,
Gresik and Satterthwaite find that the associated convergence rate is significantly
lower than that obtained for the optimal trading mechanism.
The study of Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) is subject to the following assump-
tions. Gresik and Satterthwaite study the allocation of identical objects only; that
is, all providers offer identical objects and all customers desire identical objects.
Hence, their model cannot address the allocation of differentiated objects such as
electronic services with distinct QoS requirements. If only homogeneous objects are
considered in the model, the optimal match of customers and providers cannot be
determined because it does not matter which customer trades with which provider.
As a consequence, the model presented by Gresik and Satterthwaite assumes reser-
vation values that only depend on the trader’s private information. In such a case,
however, the mechanism cannot elicit the highest possible match surplus.
Although the mechanism developed by Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) assumes
the allocation of identical objects, it is relevant to the mechanism presented in this
thesis because Gresik and Satterthwaite characterize a direct revelation mechanism
for allocating objects with double-sided private information. Subsequent approaches
adopt this method to derive second-best mechanisms whose efficiency properties
have been studied successfully (Zacharias and Williams, 2001; Cripps and Swinkels,
2006). This thesis also invokes the revelation principle to determine the optimal
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allocation rules (cf. Section 3.3). Similar to Gresik and Satterthwaite, the associated
expected payments guarantee Bayesian incentive compatibility among all traders
(cf. Section 4.2.1). In order to support the allocation of services with differentiated
QoS, this thesis must extend Gresik and Satterthwaite’s utility functions by inter-
nalizing the the QoS desired by customers and the QoS offered by providers (cf.
Section 3.2.2). Consequently, this extension supports the allocation of electronic
services with distinct QoS requirements on both market sides.
2.3.4 Double-sided, incentive incompatible
This section provides an analysis of three double-sided mechanisms that respect
quality awareness but are not incentive compatible. While the approach by Denoeud-
Belgacem et al. (2010) does not consider incentive compatibility whatsoever, the
work of Schnizler et al. (2008) estimates efficiency losses that emerge due to in-
centive incompatibility. Samimi et al. (2016) extend the single-sided mechanism by
Zaman and Grosu (2013) to double-sided, quality-aware mechanisms.
Combinatorial auctions for exchanging resources over a Grid network
Denoeud-Belgacem et al. (2010) study combinatorial auctions for exchanging re-
sources over a Grid network. Their model is based on prior research in management
science (Kwasnica et al., 2005). A Grid network is an interconnection between
computers, which provides access to electronic services in the form of computing re-
sources such as processing power, storage space or applications. On the marketplace
studied by Denoeud-Belgacem et al. (2010), multiple customers and providers sub-
mit bids for trading computational resources. They consider two types of resources,
namely computing and storage resources, whose quantity and quality are specified.
Customers and providers desire/offer combinations of these resources. Providers
submit their bids as bundles of resources available during a given time frame. These
bundles contain the reservation price the providers are willing to accept. Customers
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express their bids by specifying their desired quality attributes and the maximum
price they are willing to pay. The proposed winner determination algorithm matches
the desired/offered resource requirements and determines the allocation that maxi-
mizes the social welfare among all valid matches. Because the combinatorial winner
determination problem is NP-hard, Denoeud-Belgacem et al. (2010) propose an
iterated greedy heuristic that allocates resources in a “first come, first serve” man-
ner. With regard to pricing, Denoeud-Belgacem et al. (2010) study a variant of the
market clearing price approach commonly used in double auctions (Wilson, 1985).
In particular, they approximate the market clearing price by minimizing the gaps
between the losing bids and the computed prices of the bundles in case the market
clearing property is not verified. This pricing mechanism guarantees individual ra-
tionality and budget balance. Finally, the model of Denoeud-Belgacem et al. (2010)
is instantiated in a simulation study by executing the artifact with artificial data. In
this study, they compare the mechanism’s performance of the exact solution with
the approximated solution of the winner determination problem. They also provide
experimental results on the different pricing schemes.
Denoeud-Belgacem et al. (2010) find that due to the exponential complexity of
the winner determination problem, computing the optimal solution is infeasible. In
a setting with 100 customers and 100 providers in different time slots, the proposed
greedy heuristic arrives at an asymptotic efficiency of about 86% compared to the
optimal solution. Denoeud-Belgacem et al. find that the proposed pricing schemes
tend to favor the providers because they receive a higher share of the generated
surplus.
The approach of Denoeud-Belgacem et al. (2010) is based on the following as-
sumptions. First, their mechanism assumes a pricing model that does not support
incentive compatibility. Another drawback is their incomplete formal framework,
which is necessary for a theoretically sound assessment of the mechanism design
properties such as budget balance and individual rationality. As a result, it remains
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unclear to what extent the proposed greedy algorithm satisfies these properties. Fur-
thermore, the asymptotic efficiency of their mechanism for large markets cannot be
properly assessed.
Despite these limitations, Denoeud-Belgacem et al. list a set of economic re-
quirements on the allocation mechanism that are relevant to the approach in this
thesis. Due to the standard impossibility theorems from mechanism design theory,
some of these requirements cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. Therefore, Denoeud-
Belgacem et al. propose a tradeoff between these requirements: Their greedy mecha-
nism gives up incentive compatibility. Abandoning incentive compatibility, however,
is critical because it encourages the traders to strategically misrepresent their true
reservation values. Therefore, this thesis drops the assumption of incentive incom-
patible payments by imposing appropriate constraints for incentive compatibility on
the winner determination problem.
Trading Grid services – a multi-attribute combinatorial approach
Schnizler et al. (2008) study a multidimensional combinatorial auction mechanism
for trading electronic services among multiple providers and customers in a Grid
network. Their model is informed by prior research in auction theory (Milgrom,
2004) and Grid technologies (Lai et al., 2005). The traded services respect resource
functionalities (e.g., storage) and quality characteristics (e.g., size), as well as depen-
dencies and time attributes. For the design of the allocation mechanism, Schnizler
et al. focus on common desirable properties from mechanism design theory includ-
ing incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance. In particular,
the mechanism supports double-sided competition as a domain-specific requirement
for Grid environments, where multiple service providers publish their services and
multiple service customers discover them. The bidding language of the mechanism
allows customers and providers to specify their desired and offered QoS and in-
cludes combinatorial bids on these attributes. Based on this multi-attribute bidding
language, Schnizler et al. represent the combinatorial winner determination problem
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as a linear mixed integer problem in order to achieve a socially optimal solution.
Subsequently, the authors study two different pricing schemes to determine the pay-
ments for the allocated Grid services. First, they consider payments based on the
prominent Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey, 1961). Using these
payments, the proposed mechanism is incentive compatible and individually rational
but runs a permanent deficit in funds. Second, they study the k-pricing scheme, in
which prices are calculated based on the difference between the bids of customers
and providers (Satterthwaite and Williams, 1993). Furthermore, the model of Schni-
zler et al. is instantiated in a simulation study by executing the artifact with artificial
data. By means of this experimental evaluation, Schnizler et al. study the effect of
the k-pricing scheme on the strategic behavior of customers and providers.
Schnizler et al. (2008) find that the k-pricing scheme does not sufficiently pun-
ish strategic misrepresentation of the traders’ bids. This finding is a result of the
Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem discussed in Section 2.1.2.4, which
plays a crucial role in this thesis as well. Using the VCG outcome as a benchmark
and given the set of probability distributions, the mechanism based on the k-pricing
scheme achieves an efficiency of approximately 41.52%, averaged over 10 or 20
agents. The simulation study also indicates that the traders’ misreporting is limited
to small markets. As the number of misreporting traders increases, so too does the
risk of not being allocated by the mechanism. Regarding computational tractability,
Schnizler et al. find that the proposed mechanism is computationally very demand-
ing. Approximate solutions, however, entail adequate runtime results for up to 500
traders.
The study of Schnizler et al. (2008) makes the following assumptions regarding
the design and the evaluation of their allocation mechanism. Similar to the work
of Denoeud-Belgacem et al. (2010), Schnizler et al. are faced with a tradeoff be-
tween the four desirable economic properties of incentive compatibility, individual
rationality, budget balance, and ex post optimality. Because they assume a k-pricing
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scheme, the mechanism fails to implement incentive compatibility. Hence, the allo-
cation outcome of the mechanism is inefficient. Although the proposed simulation
study provides a set of results on the mechanism’s efficiency losses, Schnizler et al.
do not provide details regarding the asymptotic efficiency of the mechanism for
limit markets. Thus, it remains unclear whether the mechanism’s inefficiencies are
bounded when the number of agents becomes large.
Despite these assumptions, the model of Schnizler et al. (2008) is of special inter-
est for this work because Schnizler et al. consider a double-sided market for trading
electronic services of specific QoS requirements. In particular, Schnizler et al. study
the efficiency properties by using the mechanism’s optimal outcome as a bench-
mark. In their work, the optimal outcome arises from a VCG implementation of the
mechanism. It is well known in mechanism design theory that the VCG auction is a
direct revelation mechanism (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1993). Subsequent approaches
for electronic service allocation in double-sided markets use the outcome of direct
revelation mechanisms as a benchmark to quantify the efficiency of approximated
mechanisms and heuristics (Sto¨sser et al., 2010). This thesis adopts this approach
to measure the inefficiencies caused by the asymmetry of information about the
agents’ QoS (cf. Section 3.2.4). For designing a second-best mechanism that satis-
fies incentive compatibility, however, the mechanism presented in this thesis uses
transfer functions that emerge from invoking the revelation principle. In contrast to
Schnizler et al.’s k-pricing scheme, these transfers satisfy incentive compatibility (cf.
Section 4.1.2).
A combinatorial double auction resource allocation model in Cloud computing
Samimi et al. (2016) study a combinatorial double auction for Cloud computing
based on the approach for single-sided allocation mechanisms described by Zaman
and Grosu (2013). The extended model allows both providers and customers to
compete for resources on the basis of QoS demands. The proposed combinatorial
double auction considers the Cloud service requirements of both sides of the market
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and permits bidding for resource combinations. Compared to allocation mechanisms
based on the single-item auction, their model performs more efficiently because the
agents are able to bid for multiple items. Samimi et al. describe their allocation
mechanism in the following sequence. First, customers and providers submit their
bids to the mechanism. The auctioneer generates bundles consisting of the required
resource combinations and closes the auction. Next, the auctioneer determines the
final allocation of resources. The underlying winner determination algorithm is
based on a kind of assortative matching, where the bids are ranked against each
other in descending order. For the matched customer-provider pairs, the auctioneer
applies a pricing model based on the k-pricing scheme (Satterthwaite and Williams,
1993) to compensate providers for Cloud service delivery. The model of Samimi
et al. is instantiated in a simulation study by executing the artifact with artificial data.
They also report on the economic efficiency and incentive compatibility properties
of their allocation mechanism.
Samimi et al. (2016) find that their allocation mechanism yields an economically
efficient outcome. Their notion of economic efficiency refers to the magnitude of
utility that customers and providers can receive. They find that providers with low
bids and customers with high bids obtain the highest utilities. In contrast, providers
with high bids and customers with low bids even obtain negative utilities. Samimi
et al. also find that customers and providers are likely to report their bids truthfully.
Hence, they claim that their mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility.
The approach of Samimi et al. (2016) has the following shortcomings. First, the
assumptions made in the model are not sufficiently disclosed. Samimi et al. present
their findings by interpreting a set of numerical results that are difficult to replicate
and verify. Mathematical proofs are not used to support their statements. Second,
the notion of economic efficiency is not sufficiently explained. In particular, Samimi
et al. claim that their mechanism induces truthful behavior, yet formal proofs for
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incentive compatibility are omitted. In fact, k-pricing mechanisms are generally not
incentive compatible.
Although the study of Samimi et al. (2016) is based on these assumptions, it is
interesting that Samimi et al. also use a ranking technique of the submitted bids to
determine the final allocation of electronic services. As discussed earlier, Zaman
and Grosu (2013) used a similar ranking technique, which is, however, limited to
a single provider. Because double-sided competition is supported by Samimi et al.,
the mechanism sorts the bids of customers in descending order and the bids of
providers in ascending order. Then, the mechanism matches customers and providers
that are on the same rank from top to bottom. This procedure is a version of a
negative assortative allocation scheme, in which the highest value on one side is
matched to the lowest value on the other side of the market (Shimer and Smith, 2000).
For determining the optimal allocation of services with distinct QoS, however, the
assortative allocation rule must be redefined and enriched with appropriate incentive
compatibility constraints. Therefore, the mechanism proposed in this thesis uses
a positive assortative matching rule that imposes additional constraints to ensure
incentive compatibility and individual rationality (cf. Section 4.2.1).
2.3.5 Double-sided, incentive compatible
This section analyzes two double-sided allocation mechanisms that satisfy incen-
tive compatibility and support quality awareness. While the mechanisms proposed
by Muthoo and Mutuswami (2005, 2011) do not derive the socially optimal alloca-
tion rules and payments, the matching mechanism in Johnson (2013) considers an
optimality criterion from the perspective of a profit-maximizing intermediary.
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Competition and efficiency in markets with quality uncertainty / Imperfect
competition and efficiency in lemons markets
The integration of uncertainty about an object’s quality characteristics into the de-
sign of allocation mechanisms was originally proposed by Akerlof (1970). On the so-
called lemons market, customers and providers exchange lemons of privately known
qualities. Muthoo and Mutuswami (2011) study the efficiency properties of an allo-
cation mechanism with private information about the quality of the traded objects.
Their model is based on prior research in economic theory (Akerlof, 1970; Samuel-
son, 1984). Each provider has private information about the quality of a single,
indivisible object. On the other hand, there is a single customer who demands one of
these objects. Providers offer their objects at two distinct quality levels, namely high
or low. Similar to Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989), Muthoo and Mutuswami (2011)
invoke the revelation principle to derive a direct revelation mechanism which satis-
fies incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Because private information
about quality is present in their analysis, this mechanism is a second-best mecha-
nism. In particular, Muthoo and Mutuswami (2011) study the efficiency properties
of this mechanism for a varying number of competing providers. In an earlier study,
Muthoo and Mutuswami extended the model by allowing for multiple customers
who have private information on their distinct quality needs. Using a numerical
analysis, they studied the efficiency properties of the second-best mechanisms that
emerge for such markets with double-sided private information about quality.
Muthoo and Mutuswami (2011) find that increasing competition among
providers may not cause the mechanism to achieve full efficiency in some situa-
tions. In particular, if the number of providers remains below a specific threshold,
the efficiency of the second-best mechanism stagnates. Thus, the optimal number
of providers in such markets is finite. For the extended model with double-sided
information (multiple providers and multiple customers), Muthoo and Mutuswami
(2005) find that the second-best mechanism achieves full efficiency if the probability
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that the customer desires low quality is greater than 55%. If this probability is 50%,
however, the mechanism is inefficient even when the number of providers becomes
arbitrarily large. Unexpectedly, the efficiency of the mechanism appears to be non-
monotonic if the probability that the customer desires low quality is 40%. In addition,
their findings indicate that allowing for private information on the customers’ side
can be used to relax the incentive compatibility constraint of low quality providers.
The studies of Muthoo and Mutuswami (2005, 2011) are subject to the follow-
ing assumptions regarding the design of their mechanisms. Although Muthoo and
Mutuswami (2011) derive a second-best mechanism with double-sided private infor-
mation about quality to study the mechanism’s efficiency properties, their model as-
sumes a single customer. The extended model proposed in Muthoo and Mutuswami
(2005) explicitly allows for multiple customers with private quality information. Yet
in this extension, Muthoo and Mutuswami (2005) do not derive the optimal allo-
cation rules or payments used by the second-best mechanism. Hence, it remains
unclear how the designer must determine the transfers so as to incentivize truthful
behavior. Moreover, private information about the quality of the objects is limited
to two discrete quality levels (i.e., high and low). Therefore, the model of Muthoo
and Mutuswami (2005, 2011) does not support arbitrary (i.e., continuous) quality
values.
Despite these assumptions, their studies are relevant to this thesis because
Muthoo and Mutuswami explicitly allow for differentiated quality characteristics
of the traded objects. In particular, these quality characteristics are modeled as the
private information of each trader in the market. Subsequent research applies this
concept by integrating the object’s quality as private information for the special case
of dynamic matching markets (Kultti et al., 2015). This thesis adopts this approach
by modeling each trader’s distinct quality requirements as the private information
of that trader (cf. Section 3.2). In order to obtain a mechanism that allocates ser-
vices of differentiated QoS, however, this thesis drops the assumption of discrete
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quality levels by defining the QoS as continuous private information. Moreover,
Muthoo and Mutuswami provide the boundaries for allocation in the first-best and
the second-best mechanism. These allocation boundaries illustrate the distortion due
to the presence of private information about quality. Because this thesis extends the
work of Muthoo and Mutuswami toward continuous QoS, the associated allocation
boundaries must be adapted as well (cf. Section 4.2.3).
Matching through position auctions
If the social welfare depends on the privately known QoS of the matched customers
and providers, double-sided matching mechanisms may be used to determine the
allocation of electronic services. In these mechanisms, customers and providers
only produce mutual surplus if they are matched together. With a setting of double-
sided private information, Johnson (2013) studies the optimal matching and payment
rules from the perspective of a profit-maximizing intermediary. The direct revelation
mechanism employs the concept of positive assortative matching; that is, agents of
the highest quality level are matched together, the second highest likewise, and so
on. This mechanism is incentive compatible and individually rational for all agents.
One way to implement this mechanism is by position auctions, in which multiple
customers and providers simultaneously submit their bids to the mechanism, the
bids are ranked against each other and the agents are allocated accordingly. Johnson
studies two different formats used in position auctions, namely the winners-pay for-
mat and the all-pay format. In the winners-pay format only matched agents pay their
bid to the auctioneer. The all-pay format requires all agents to pay their bid, regard-
less of a successful match. Finally, Johnson analyzes the monotonicity properties
of the bid functions and the effect of the market size on the implementability of the
profit-maximizing allocation in the winners-pay format.
Johnson (2013) finds that his model with multiple customers and providers gen-
eralizes some of the results obtained by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) on how
an intermediary engages in price discrimination. In addition to identifying standard
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conditions sufficient for maximizing the intermediary’s profit, Johnson finds that a
set of hazard rate bounds is necessary to guarantee that higher types are eligible to
match to larger sets of partner qualities. With these assumptions, it suffices to solicit
a one-dimensional bid from the agents to determine the profit-maximizing match
and to implement the profit-maximizing payments. In the case of the winners-pay
format, however, Johnson finds that the bid functions must be increasing to enable
the implementability of the mechanism. Finally, it is found that in sufficiently large
markets, the non-monotonicities in the bid functions disappear.
The study of Johnson (2013) is based on the following assumptions. Johnson
assumes that the matching mechanism is used by a profit-maximizing intermediary.
Thus, he does not derive the optimal allocation mechanism and payments from the
perspective of a social planner, who seeks to maximize the expected social welfare.
Because the intermediary’s profit is maximized by the mechanism, it does not fa-
cilitate distributed decision-making among the agents. Moreover, Johnson does not
study the asymptotic efficiency properties of the optimal allocation rules.
The approach taken in this thesis is informed by the work of Johnson (2013).
More specifically, the allocation mechanism proposed in this thesis extends John-
son’s mechanism by maximizing the expected social welfare under budget balance
instead of the intermediary’s profit. This change requires re-defining the optimiza-
tion problem faced by the mechanism (cf. Section 4.2). In Johnson’s model, the
agents on both market sides are of the same “type” in the sense that they all use
the same valuation function. In contrast to this model, markets for allocating elec-
tronic services involve two distinct types of agents, namely customers and providers.
Consequently, the model proposed in this thesis extends that of Johnson by sup-
porting customer-provider matching in double-sided markets. In this extension, the
agents’ valuation function defined by Johnson remain unchanged for customers. For
providers, however, a cost function must be defined that integrates the differentiated
QoS of the matched agent pairs (cf. Section 3.2.2). Once these modifications are in
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place, the approaches of Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) as well as Muthoo and Mu-
tuswami (2005, 2011) can be applied to study the asymptotic efficiency properties
of the emerging second-best allocation mechanism.
Chapter 3
Model
For He said, “See that you make all
things according to the pattern shown
you on the mountain.”
Hebrews 8:5b, The Bible
(New King James Version)
This chapter describes the formal model used for designing the allocation mech-
anism for electronic services with private quality information. The framework is
based on the notation introduced in Chapter 2 as well as on the model of Johnson
(2013), who derived a set of conditions for profit-maximizing matching markets.
This section represents each requirement identified in Section 2.2 in the formal
model.
3.1 Representing double-sided competition
The allocation mechanism for electronic services must support double-sided com-
petition among multiple customers and multiple providers. Thus, the model must
allow both customers and providers to submit their QoS demands and offers to the
mechanism. Let AC with N = |AC| denote the set of all customers and let AP with
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M = |AP| denote the set of all providers. Each customer ai ∈ AC demands a sin-
gle, standardized electronic service by submitting a bid that specifies his desired
QoS. For instance, customers demand standardized storage services by submitting
the amount of the required storage. Likewise, each provider b j ∈AP offers a single
electronic service by submitting a bid that specifies the QoS he actually offers. As
discussed in Section 2.2.2, standardized services are electronic services of equal
functional properties. Since M competing customers demand services from N com-
peting providers, the maximum number of allocations that can arise in this setting
is given by K = min{M,N}. To extend bilateral models for service allocation, it is
assumed that K ≥ 2.
3.2 Representing quality as private information
In this section, the QoS desired by customers and the QoS offered by providers are
internalized in the allocation mechanism. Because the quality of the services are
mutually unknown, it is modeled as double-sided private information. This private
information reflects the preferences each agent assigns to the electronic service. To
this end, valuation and cost represent the agents’ reservation values for the electronic
services. Since customers and providers only produce mutual surplus if they are
matched together, valuation and cost functions depend on the privately known QoS
of each agent. Using these interdependent functions, the expected utilities of the
agents can be defined. Finally, this section presents the definitions of the social
choice function and the direct revelation mechanism of the allocation problem in
this research.
3.2.1 Desired and offered quality
Each customer privately observes the desired quality θi that he has assigned to the
demanded service. Because desired quality is that customer’s private information, it
is drawn from a probability density function f (θi), being strictly positive on [0,θ ]
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with cumulative distribution function F(θi). On the supply side, each provider pri-
vately learns the actual quality σ j that he can offer for the electronic service. The
quality offered by providers is drawn from a probability density function h(σ j),
being strictly positive on [0,σ ] with cumulative distribution function H(σ j). Let
θ = (θ1, . . . ,θN) and σ = (σ1, . . . ,σM) be the private information vectors of all
customers and providers, respectively. The vectors θ−i = (θ1, . . . ,θi−1,θi+1, . . . ,θN)
and σ− j = (σ1, . . . ,σ j−1,σ j+1, . . . ,σM) specify the private information except for
ai and b j, respectively. Further, let Eθ−i,σ denote the expectation over all private
information conditional on customer ai’s information, and let Eθ ,σ− j denote the anal-
ogous expectation for provider b j. The unconditional expectation over all private
information is denoted by E.
3.2.2 Valuation and cost
Customer ai’s valuation for consuming a service is given by v(θi,σ j). This valuation
can be interpreted as ai’s maximum willingness to pay for the service. It depends on
ai’s desired quality θi, as well as on the difference between his own desired quality θi
and provider b j’s offered quality σ j. The definition of v(θi,σ j) captures the fact that
provider b j does not know ai’s willingness to pay. This research focuses on customer
valuation functions that are non-monotonic in the quality offered by the provider.
For instance, a customer may prefer a service with medium over high computational
capacity. A high-capacity service is well able to process many simultaneous requests
from the customer’s application. If, however, this application is not provided with
enough computational power or resources, it will fail to answer these simultaneous
requests in due time. This leads to higher buffering in the application and thus longer
response times. Thus, a customer’s valuation must take into account the application
that uses the service and the tradeoff between being idle or buffering heavily (Hang
and Singh, 2010). Therefore, any mismatch between desired quality and offered
quality creates adjustment problems for the customer. That is, v(θi,σ j) is maximized
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when the supplied quality and the desired quality are equal (i.e., when θi = σ j). By
assumption, the maximal value is increasing in θi.
On the supply side, each provider b j’s provision cost c(θi,σ j) for his service
depends on his offered quality σ j and on the difference between his own offered
quality σ j and the customer’s desired quality θi. This definition suggests that cus-
tomers do not know the provision costs of providers. If a provider produces a quality
lower than the quality desired by a customer, this provider incurs higher cost from
not fulfilling the requirements. If, in contrast, a provider maintains higher quality
than desired, his cost increases due to idle resources (Greenberg et al., 2009). Hence,
c(θi,σ j) is minimized when σ j = θi and when the minimal value is increasing in
σ j. This assumption captures the fact that a mismatch in offered quality and desired
quality creates higher provision costs resulting from after-sales customer service
cost and missed opportunity cost. Both v(θi,σ j) and c(θi,σ j) are assumed to be
thrice differentiable.
3.2.3 Expected utilities
As discussed in Section 2.1.1.1, this research assumes risk-neutral agents with quasi-
linear utility functions. This utility function is the internalization of each agent’s
performance measure and is based on the preferences concerning the allocation of
electronic services. Hence, utility functions are additively separable and linear in
money and in the reservation value for the electronic service.
For describing an allocation of a service, a decision variable is used. Deci-
sion variables suit well to model the allocation of services between customers and
providers. Let xi j(θ ,σ)∈ [0,1] denote the probability that a service is allocated from
provider b j to customer ai. For example, if x11(θ ,σ) = 1, the service is provided by
provider b1 and consumed by customer a1 in the final allocation. For ease of exposi-
tion, this model adopts vectorized function arguments without further reference and,
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for example, uses the convention xi j(θi,θ−i,σ)≡ xi j(θ1, . . . ,θN ,σ1, . . . ,σM) in any
appropriate context.
Using this notation, each customer’s expected utility function is given by
UC(θi) = Eθ−i,σ
[ M
∑
j=1
v(θi,σ j)xi j(θi,θ−i,σ)− tC(θi,θ−i,σ)
]
, (3.1)
where tC(θi,θ−i,σ) is the monetary transfer made by ai conditional on all other
agents’ private information. Similarly, the expected utility of provider b j is given by
UP(σ j) = Eθ ,σ− j
[
tP(θ ,σ j,σ− j)−
N
∑
i=1
c(θi,σ j)xi j(θ ,σ j,σ− j)
]
, (3.2)
where tP(θ ,σ j,σ− j) corresponds to the monetary compensation provider b j re-
ceives for providing a service to customer ai.
3.2.4 Mechanism definition
As discussed in Section 2.1.1, this research characterizes the allocation mechanism
for electronic services in terms of a direct revelation mechanism. In a direct reve-
lation mechanism, all customers are induced to reveal their desired QoS θi and all
providers are induced to reveal their offered QoS σ j to the mechanism. Then, the
mechanism dictates the allocation of electronic services and the respective monetary
transfers. The direct revelation mechanism is thus defined by the decision variables
xi j(θ ,σ), as well as the monetary transfers that accrue for providing and consuming
electronic services. As discussed in Section 2.1.1.2, the social choice function for
this setting is given by
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fsc : R+×·· ·×R+→Ω (3.3)
(θ ,σ) 7→ (xi j(θ ,σ), tC(θ ,σ), tP(θ ,σ)) (3.4)
for all customers ai and providers b j. Using the definition for social choice
functions, the direct revelation mechanism is given by a set of functions
M = {xi j(θ ,σ), tC(θ ,σ), tP(θ ,σ)} (3.5)
for all ai and b j.
3.3 Representing incentive compatibility
To determine the optimal equilibrium outcome from among all possible mechanisms,
this research adopts the standard approach in mechanism design theory by invoking
the revelation principle (cf. Section 2.1.1.4). The revelation principle essentially
states that for any outcome of a mechanism that is in Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
there exists a direct revelation mechanism with an identical equilibrium outcome.
As pointed out in Section 2.1.1.3, the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by direct
revelation mechanisms is that which satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility; that
is, all agents’ honest type reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the under-
lying game. The concept of Bayesian Nash equilibria is applicable to this model
because each agent’s QoS is known only to that agent and is observed neither by the
mechanism designer nor by the other agents.
Recall from Section 2.1.2.1, the mechanism is (Bayesian) incentive compatible
if and only if for each customer’s reported desired quality θˆ 6= θi
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UC(θi)≥ Eθ−i,σ
[ M
∑
j=1
v(θi,σ j)xi j(θˆ ,θ−i,σ)− tC(θˆ ,θ−i,σ)
]
, (3.6)
and for each provider’s reported offered QoS σˆ 6= σ j
UP(σ j)≥ Eθ ,σ− j
[
tP(θ , σˆ ,σ− j)−
N
∑
i=1
c(θi,σ j)xi j(θ , σˆ ,σ− j)
]
. (3.7)
3.4 Representing individual rationality
In addition to incentive compatibility, the mechanism must satisfy individual ratio-
nality. As discussed in Section 2.1.2.2, rational customers and providers will not
participate in the mechanism if their expected utility is negative (evaluated at one of
the distinct timing stages). This constraint is also known as the voluntary participa-
tion constraint, which ensures that no agent is worse off after the mechanism is run.
Similar to common mechanism design settings, this research considers the interim
timing state for individual rationality. At the interim stage, each agent can withdraw
from the mechanism once he observes his own type, not knowing the types of all
other agents. Thus, the individual rationality constraint ensures that, conditional on
his private information, every agent imputes an expected utility from participating
in the mechanism that is greater than or equal to the utility of his outside option. In
this research, the outside option of each agent is zero. Formally, the mechanism is
individually rational if and only if
UC(θi)≥ 0 for customer ai, and (3.8)
UP(σ j)≥ 0 for provider b j. (3.9)
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3.5 Representing budget balance
As pointed out in Section 2.1.2.3, the mechanism must raise sufficient funds from
the agents to cover the cost for running the platform. In this research, the mechanism
balances the budget if all expected transfers made among the agents add to zero. This
constraint is necessary because the mechanism must not depend on any external
source of funds. That is, (ex ante) budget balance in this model is defined as the
difference between the sum of all expected monetary compensations received by
providers and the sum of all expected monetary payments made by customers for
service allocation. Formally, (ex ante) budget balance is defined as
N
∑
i=1
∫ θ
0
Eθ−i,σ [tC(θi,θ−i,σ)] f (θi)dθi
−
M
∑
j=1
∫ σ
0
Eθ ,σ− j [tP(θ ,σ j,σ− j)]h(σ j)dσ j = 0. (3.10)
3.6 Representing optimality
Since ex post optimality is unattainable when incentive compatibility, individual ra-
tionality, and budget balance are required, this research attempts to find a mechanism
that achieves ex ante optimality. As discussed in Section 2.1.2.4, an ex ante optimal
mechanism is a second-best mechanism that maximizes the expected social welfare
among all incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms, subject to
budget balance. Because agents use quasi-linear utility functions, the expected so-
cial welfare is defined as the sum of all agents’ expected utilities. By accumulating
the expected utilities in (3.1) and (3.2) over all agents and substituting for the con-
straint of budget balance (3.10), the expected social welfare of the service allocation
is calculated as follows:
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N
∑
i=1
∫ θ
0
UC(θi) f (θi)dθi+
M
∑
j=1
∫ σ
0
UP(σ j)h(σ j)dσ j
=
N
∑
i=1
∫ θ
0
Eθ−i,σ
[ M
∑
j=1
v(θi,σ j)xi j(θi,θ−i,σ)− tC(θi,θ−i,σ)
]
f (θi)dθi
+
M
∑
j=1
∫ σ
0
Eθ ,σ− j
[
tP(θ ,σ j,σ− j)
−
N
∑
i=1
c(θi,σ j)xi j(θ ,σ j,σ− j)
]
h(σ j)dσ j
= E
[ N
∑
i=1
M
∑
j=1
(v(θi,σ j)− c(θi,σ j))xi j(θ ,σ)
]
. (3.11)
The mechanism’s objective is to maximize the expression obtained in (3.11) over
all agents. Therefore, the mechanism faces the optimization problem
max
xi j
E
[ N
∑
i=1
M
∑
j=1
(v(θi,σ j)− c(θi,σ j))xi j(θ ,σ)
]
, (3.12)
subject to
• incentive compatibility as defined in Section 3.3,
• individual rationality as defined in Section 3.4, and
• feasibility constraints as defined by
0≤
M
∑
j=1
xi j(θ ,σ)≤ 1 ∀ai and 0≤
N
∑
i=1
xi j(θ ,σ)≤ 1 ∀b j. (3.13)
Notice that the budget balance constraint in Section 3.5 is always fulfilled in this
setting because it has been incorporated into the derivation of the objective function
(3.11).
Chapter 4
Allocation Mechanism
At the present time your plenty will
supply what they need, so that in turn
their plenty will supply what you need.
The goal is equality.
2 Corinthians 8:14, The Bible
(New International Version)
This chapter characterizes the economic properties of the mechanism based on
the model introduced in Chapter 3 and defines the mechanism’s allocation rule and
expected monetary transfers. It then lists conditions sufficient for this mechanism to
maximize the expected social welfare. Finally, a numerical example illustrates the
allocation process for a market with uniformly distributed QoS.
4.1 Characterizing economic properties
As discussed in Section 3.6, ex post optimality cannot be achieved when incentive
compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance are required. Therefore, this
research studies the associated second-best mechanism that maximizes the expected
social welfare among all incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms.
Related literature in mechanism design theory, including Myerson and Satterthwaite
63
64 CHAPTER 4. ALLOCATION MECHANISM
(1983), as well as Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989), have suggested using this ex
ante performance measure instead of the corresponding ex post criterion. Similar
to these approaches, the following sections define two functions that are crucial in
constructing the second-best mechanism. Subsequently, incentive compatibility and
individual rationality constraints are characterized for the given setting, followed by
some results concerning budget balance.
4.1.1 Virtual valuation & virtual cost
In mechanism design theory, the concept of virtual valuations plays a central role
when designing Bayesian optimal mechanisms. Let the virtual valuation of customer
ai be given by
ψC(θi,σ j) = v(θi,σ j)− 1−F(θi)f (θi)
∂v(θi,σ j)
∂θi
. (4.1)
The virtual valuation function of ai is based on his actual valuation defined in
Section 3.2.2, but subtracts from it a term that represents the informational rent
of the agent. This informational rent represents the inevitable revenue loss caused
by the private information of the agents. It can be interpreted as the surplus each
customer must pay the mechanism for providing incentives to the agents to honestly
declare their types (Bo¨rgers, 2015). Hence, the virtual valuation of ai expresses the
strategic behavior of ai in an indirect mechanism implementation. Since v(θi,σ j) is
maximized for θi = σ j and increasing in that maximal value, ψC(θi,σ j) is strictly
smaller than the actual valuation. Hence, customers have an incentive to understate
their true valuation. They behave strategically in this fashion in order to influence
their transaction prices.
Similar to the setting for customers, providers are endued with virtual provision
cost functions. Virtual provision cost functions are based on the actual provision
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costs of providers but add to them the informational rent that providers are charged
by the mechanism on top of their real provision cost. Insofar, each provider’s in-
formational rent can be viewed as a surplus that is withheld by the mechanism to
provide adequate incentives for honest type declaration among all agents. The virtual
provision cost of providers is defined by
ψP(θi,σ j) = c(θi,σ j)+
H(σ j)
h(σ j)
∂c(θi,σ j)
∂σ j
. (4.2)
The virtual provision cost reflects the strategic behavior of providers in an in-
direct mechanism implementation. Since c(θi,σ j) is minimized when σ j = θi and
increasing in that minimal value, the virtual cost is strictly greater than the actual
provision cost. Thus, a provider has an incentive to overstate his true cost. In this
way, providers try to raise their transaction prices for the offered service.
4.1.2 Incentive compatibility & individual rationality
As discussed in Section 2.2, the optimal allocation mechanism must satisfy two spe-
cific requirements from economic theory. First, the mechanism must ensure that no
agent has an incentive to misreport his true type, assuming that all other agents report
truthfully (incentive compatibility). Second, no agent can be forced to participate
in the mechanism but must be given the liberty to withdraw from it at the interim
stage; that is, when all agents know their own private information, while all the other
agents have not yet reported their private information (individual rationality). The
following Lemma characterizes the set of all incentive compatible and individually
rational mechanisms for the allocation problem in this research.
Lemma 4.1. Let xi j(θ ,σ) be the probability that provider b j is allocated
to customer ai. Then transfer functions tC(θ ,σ) and tP(θ ,σ) exist such that
{xi j(θ ,σ), tC(θ ,σ), tP(θ ,σ)} is incentive compatible and individually rational if
66 CHAPTER 4. ALLOCATION MECHANISM
and only if Eθ−i,σ [xi j(θi, ·)] is non-decreasing, Eθ ,σ− j [xi j(·,σ j)] is non-increasing
and
E
[ N
∑
i=1
M
∑
j=1
(ψC(θi,σ j)−ψP(θi,σ j))xi j(θ ,σ)
]
≥ 0. (4.3)
Proof. Suppose {xi j(θ ,σ), tC(θ ,σ), tP(θ ,σ)} is incentive compatible. Initially, the
argument is derived for providers. For any quality pair σˆ 6= σ j we must have
UP(σ j)≥ Eθ ,σ− j
[
tP(θ , σˆ ,σ− j)−
N
∑
i=1
c(θi,σ j)xi j(θ , σˆ ,σ− j)
]
and (4.4)
UP(σˆ)≥ Eθ ,σ− j
[
tP(θ ,σ j,σ− j)−
N
∑
i=1
c(θi, σˆ)xi j(θ ,σ j,σ− j)
]
. (4.5)
These two inequalities imply that
∫ σˆ
σ j
Eθ ,σ− j
[ N
∑
i=1
(
xi j(θ , t,σ− j)− xi j(θ , σˆ ,σ− j)
) ∂
∂ t
c(θi, t)
]
dt ≥ 0. (4.6)
Therefore, if σˆ > σ j,
Eθ ,σ− j [xi j(θ ,σ j,σ− j)]≥ Eθ ,σ− j [xi j(θ , σˆ ,σ− j)], (4.7)
and thus Eθ ,σ− j [xi j(·,σ j)] is non-increasing. A similar argument for customers
shows that Eθ−i,σ [xi j(θi, ·)] must be non-decreasing. Corollary 1 in Milgrom and Se-
gal (2002) provides expressions for the indirect utility of each agent in any incentive
compatible mechanism:
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UC(θi) =UC(0)+
∫ θi
0
Eθ−i,σ
[ M
∑
j=1
∂v(r,σ j)
∂ r
xi j(r,θ−i,σ)
]
dr and (4.8)
UP(σ j) =UP(σ)+
∫ σ
σ j
Eθ ,σ− j
[ N
∑
i=1
∂c(θi,r)
∂ r
xi j(θ ,r,σ− j)
]
dr, (4.9)
where UC(0) and UP(σ) are the expected utilities evaluated at the lower and up-
per quality bounds, respectively. By substituting the indirect utilities (4.8) and (4.9)
into the sum of all agents’ expected utilities given in (3.1) and (3.2), an alternative
expression for the expected social welfare defined within the maximization problem
in (3.12) is obtained:
N
∑
i=1
∫ θ
0
UC(θi) f (θi)dθi+
M
∑
j=1
∫ σ
0
UP(σ j)h(σ j)dσ j
=
N
∑
i=1
∫ θ
0
(
UC(0)+
∫ θi
0
Eθ−i,σ
[ M
∑
j=1
∂v(r,σ j)
∂ r
xi j(r,θ−i,σ)
]
dr
)
f (θi)dθi
+
M
∑
j=1
∫ σ
0
(
UP(σ)+
∫ σ
σ j
Eθ ,σ− j
[ N
∑
i=1
∂c(θi,r)
∂ r
xi j(θ ,r,σ− j)
]
dr
)
h(σ j)dσ j.
(4.10)
Expression (4.10) is the expected social welfare expressed by the agents’ indi-
rect utilities. Therefore, it must equal the expected social welfare obtained by the
agents’ direct utilities in the maximand of (3.12). Equating these two expressions,
followed by some basic algebraic manipulations, integration by parts, rearrangement
and collection of similar terms yields
N
∑
i=1
UC(0)+
M
∑
j=1
UP(σ) = E
[ N
∑
i=1
M
∑
j=1
(ψC(θi,σ j)−ψP(θi,σ j))xi j(θ ,σ)
]
. (4.11)
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Since individual rationality holds, UC(0)≥ 0 and UP(σ)≥ 0 apply, which gives
expression (4.3) in Lemma 4.1.
Suppose now that xi j(θ ,σ) satisfies (4.3) and that Eθ−i,σ [xi j(θi, ·)] is non-
decreasing and Eθ ,σ− j [xi j(·,σ j)] is non-increasing. Consider the following expected
payments made by customer ai
Eθ−i,σ [tC(θi,θ−i,σ)]
= Eθ−i,σ
[ M
∑
j=1
v(θi,σ j)xi j(θi,θ−i,σ)−
∫ θi
0
M
∑
j=1
∂v(r,σ j)
∂ r
xi j(r,θ−i,σ)dr
]
(4.12)
and the expected compensation received by provider b j
Eθ ,σ− j [tP(θ ,σ j,σ− j)]
= Eθ ,σ− j
[ N
∑
i=1
c(θi,σ j)xi j(θ ,σ j,σ− j)+
∫ σ
σ j
N
∑
i=1
∂c(θi,r)
∂ r
xi j(θ ,r,σ− j)dr
]
.
(4.13)
These expected transfers are obtained by equating the direct and indirect ex-
pected utilities, as well as by setting the worst-off quality payoffs to zero; that is,
UC(0) =UP(σ) = 0.
It remains to be verified that these expected transfers satisfy incentive compati-
bility. To check incentive compatibility of (4.12), observe that
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UC(θi,θ−i,σ)−UC(θˆ ,θ−i,σ)
= Eθ−i,σ
[ M
∑
j=1
v(θi,σ j)(xi j(θi,θ−i,σ)− xi j(θˆ ,θ−i,σ))
− (tC(θi,θ−i,σ)− tC(θˆ ,θ−i,σ))
]
= Eθ−i,σ
[ M
∑
j=1
v(θi,σ j)
∫ θi
θˆ
∂
∂ r
xi j(r,θ−i,σ)dr
−
( M
∑
j=1
v(θi,σ j)xi j(θi,θ−i,σ)− v(θˆ ,σ j)xi j(θˆ ,θ−i,σ)
+
∫ θˆ
θi
M
∑
j=1
∂v(r,σ j)
∂ r
xi j(r,θ−i,σ)dr
)]
= Eθ−i,σ
[ M
∑
j=1
v(θi,σ j)
∫ θi
θˆ
∂
∂ r
xi j(r,θ−i,σ)dr
−
M
∑
j=1
∫ θi
θˆ
v(r,σ j)
∂
∂ r
xi j(r,θ−i,σ)dr
]
= Eθ−i,σ
[∫ θi
θˆ
M
∑
j=1
(v(θi,σ j)− v(r,σ j)) ∂∂ rxi j(r,θ−i,σ)dr
]
≥ 0. (4.14)
The last inequality is a consequence of Eθ−i,σ [xi j(θi, ·)] being non-decreasing.
Recall that customer’s valuation is increasing in the maximal value. Therefore, cus-
tomer ai would do better reporting θi instead of θˆ . The proof of incentive compati-
bility for providers is analogous.
Because (4.3) holds by assumption, the sum over all expected utilities evaluated
at the lowest and highest qualities respectively must be non-negative. Further, equa-
tions (4.8) and (4.9) imply that UC(θi) is increasing in θi and UP(σ j) is decreasing
in σ j. Due to these monotonicity properties and because of (4.3), it suffices to verify
individual rationality for customer’s lowest desired quality θi = 0 and provider’s
highest offered quality σ j = σ . This yields UC(θi)≥ 0 and UP(σ j)≥ 0.
70 CHAPTER 4. ALLOCATION MECHANISM
4.1.3 Budget balance
As discussed in Section 2.2.6, the budget balance property is required to allow for
distributed decision-making among the agents. Budget-balanced mechanisms do not
depend on external sources of funds. Lemma 4.1 is crucial for constructing ex ante
optimal mechanisms because it states that if the decision variables xi j(θ ,σ) satisfy
the monotonicity properties, as well as inequality (4.3), then transfers tC(θ ,σ) and
tP(θ ,σ) exist, such that {xi j(θ ,σ), tC(θ ,σ), tP(θ ,σ)} is an incentive compatible
and individually rational mechanism. However, along with incentive compatibly and
individual rationality, the budget balance property of the mechanism must still be
verified. The next Lemma establishes that the mechanisms identified by Lemma 4.1
also satisfy budget balance.
Lemma 4.2. Any incentive compatible, individually rational mechanism satisfies ex
ante budget balance.
Proof. To check ex ante budget balance, it must be shown that the net amount of
payments made by customers and compensations received by providers never runs
a deficit. Subtracting the sum of expected compensations from the sum of expected
payments yields
N
∑
i=1
∫ θ
0
Eθ−i,σ [tC(θi,θ−i,σ)] f (θi)dθi−
M
∑
j=1
∫ σ
0
Eθ ,σ− j [tP(θ ,σ j,σ− j)]h(σ j)dσ j
= E
[ N
∑
i=1
M
∑
j=1
v(θi,σ j)xi j(θi,θ−i,σ)−
N
∑
i=1
M
∑
j=1
1−F(θi)
f (θi)
∂v(r,σ j)
∂ r
xi j(r,θ−i,σ)
]
−E
[ M
∑
j=1
N
∑
i=1
c(θi,σ j)xi j(θ ,σ j,σ− j)+
M
∑
j=1
N
∑
i=1
H(σ j)
h(σ j)
∂c(θi,r)
∂ r
xi j(θ ,r,σ− j)
]
= E
[ N
∑
i=1
M
∑
j=1
(ψC(θi,σ j)−ψP(θi,σ j))xi j(θ ,σ)
]
≥ 0. (4.15)
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The inequality in line (4.15) is a consequence of (4.3) in any incentive compatible
and individually rational mechanism. Hence, the net balance of what customers pay
and what providers receive in the mechanism is greater than or equal to zero in
expectation. Exact equality can always be achieved by subtracting a constant from
customers’ payments.
4.2 Optimization
As discussed in Section 3.6, the ultimate objective of the allocation mechanism is to
maximize the expected social welfare. Section 4.1.2 characterized the set of all allo-
cation mechanisms that satisfy incentive compatibility and individual rationality (cf.
Lemma 4.1). This section provides the definition of the direct revelation mechanism
introduced in Section 3.2.4 in two steps. First, the allocation rule of the mechanism
is specified. Then, a set of conditions are provided that are sufficient for the mecha-
nism to maximize the expected social welfare among all incentive compatible and
individually rational mechanisms.
4.2.1 Allocation rule & expected transfers
An allocation rule specifies the conditions for service exchange to take place be-
tween customers and providers and determines the expected monetary transfers. The
definition of the allocation rule in this research requires some additional notation.
Let the difference in virtual valuation and virtual provision cost be defined as
ψ(θi,σ j) = ψC(θi,σ j)−ψP(θi,σ j). (4.16)
Using this definition, the reserve functions of customer ai and provider b j are
respectively given by
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RC(θi) =
sup{σ j ∈ [0,σ ] : ψ(θi,σ j)≥ 0} if {σ j : ψ(θi,σ j)≥ 0} 6= /00 otherwise,
(4.17)
RP(σ j) =
inf{θi ∈ [0,θ ] : ψ(θi,σ j)≥ 0} if {θi : ψ(θi,σ j)≥ 0} 6= /0θ otherwise. (4.18)
Reserve function RC(θi) is used by customer ai to identify the worst possi-
ble provider (i.e., the one with the highest offered quality) under the constraint
ψ(θi,σ j) ≥ 0, given his own desired quality θi. Reserve function RP(σ j) is used
by provider b j to identify the worst possible customer (i.e., the one with the lowest
desired quality) under the same constraint, given his own offered quality σ j. These
reserve functions correspond to the traders’ reserve prices in private value auctions.
A reserve price is the lowest price that a seller is willing to accept for selling the
object (Krishna, 2002).
In addition, the lowest possible desired quality among all customers and, respec-
tively, the highest possible offered quality among all providers are defined as
θi = inf{θi ∈ [0,θ ] : {σ j : ψ(θi,σ j)≥ 0} 6= /0}} and (4.19)
σ j = sup{σ j ∈ [0,σ ] : {θi : ψ(θi,σ j)≥ 0} 6= /0}}. (4.20)
The customer with desired quality θi is the worst-off customer in the market,
while the provider with offered quality σ j is the worst-off provider. Let
ρθ (θi) = |{θk ∈ θ : θk ≥ θi}| (4.21)
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denote the rank of desired quality θi within the vector of all customers’ desired
qualities θ = {θ1, . . . ,θN}. Define ρσ (σi) similarly for providers. The quantity
wCk (θi) =
(N−1)!
(N− k)!(k−1)!F(θi)
N−k(1−F(θi))k−1 (4.22)
gives the probability that customer’s desired quality θi has rank k within vec-
tor θ . Define wPk (σ j) similarly for providers. Further, let f(k)(·) and h(k)(·) be the
probability density functions of the k-th order statistic of customers and providers
respectively. In statistics, the k-th order statistic of a sample is equal to the k-th
smallest value of that sample (David and Nagaraja, 2003). The associated cumula-
tive distribution functions are denoted by F(k)(·) and H(k)(·).
As pointed out in Section 3.2.4, the direct revelation mechanism in this research
consists of the set of decision variables and the set of expected monetary transfers
among the agents. The following definition summarizes these variables and specifies
the direct revelation mechanism proposed in this research.
Definition 4.1. The Truncated Positive Assortative Allocation (TPAA) mechanism
is defined by the allocation rule
xi j(θ ,σ) =
1 if ρθ (θi) = ρσ (σ j) = k and ψ(θi,σ j)≥ 0,0 otherwise (4.23)
with expected payments of customers
TC(θi) =
K
∑
k=1
wCk (θi)
∫ RC(θi)
0
v(θi,r)h(k)(r)dr
−
∫ θi
θi
K
∑
k=1
wCk (s)
∫ RC(s)
0
∂v(s,r)
∂ s
h(k)(r)drds (4.24)
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and expected compensations for providers
TP(σ j) =
K
∑
k=1
wPk (σ j)
∫ θ
RP(σ j)
c(r,σ j) f(k)(r)dr
+
∫ σ j
σ j
K
∑
k=1
wPk (s)
∫ θ
RP(s)
∂c(r,s)
∂ s
f(k)(r)drds. (4.25)
The allocation rule of the TPAA mechanism captures two distinct features. First,
a service is allocated from a provider to a customer if and only if the rank of ai’s
desired quality is equal to the rank of b j’s offered quality. This means that the service
from the provider with the highest offered quality is allocated to the customer with
the highest desired quality, the second-highest, and so on. Such mechanisms are
positively assortative (Shimer and Smith, 2000). Second, service allocation from a
provider to a customer takes place if and only if the difference in ai’s virtual valuation
and b j’s virtual provision cost is positive.
Notice that the associated transfers are the same as the expected transfers (4.12)
and (4.13) derived in the proof of Lemma 4.1 but evaluated at the allocation rule
(4.23). These transfers are similar to the payments in other mechanism design set-
tings. A customer’s expected payment is his expected surplus less his cost that incurs
due to information revelation. Similarly, a provider’s expected compensation equals
his expected surplus plus a term he receives for revealing his information.
4.2.2 Maximizing expected social welfare
This section shows that the TPAA mechanism in Definition 4.1 maximizes the
expected social welfare among all incentive compatible and individually rational
mechanisms characterized in Lemma 4.1. The first argument demonstrates that the
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monotonicity properties required in Lemma 4.1 are satisfied. Then, the main result
is stated in terms of Theorem 4.1.
Taking the partial derivative of the expected allocation probability and evaluating
this variable at the allocation rule (4.23) for customers gives
∂
∂θi
Eθ−i,σ [xi j(θi, ·)] =
∂
∂θi
K
∑
k=1
wCk (θi)
∫ RC(θi)
0
h(k)(r)dr
=
∂
∂θi
K
∑
k=1
wCk (θi)H(k)(RC(θi))
=
K
∑
k=1
∂wCk (θi)
∂θi
H(k)(RC(θi))+
K
∑
k=1
wCk (θi)h(k)(RC(θi))R
′
C(θi).
(4.26)
Observe that the second summand in (4.26) is always positive because RC(θi)
is increasing. For the first summand the same argument as in Johnson (2011) is
applied: Fix index k∗. Then increase all terms above k > k∗ where ∂wCk (θi)/∂θi
is negative, and decrease all terms below k < k∗ with ∂wCk (θi)/∂θi being positive.
By the binomial theorems (Abramowitz and Stegun, 1972), the following identities
hold:
K
∑
k=1
wCk (θi) = 1 and
K
∑
k=1
∂wCk (θi)
∂θi
= 0. (4.27)
Thus, equation (4.26) can be estimated as follows:
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∂
∂θi
Eθ−i,σ [xi j(θi, ·)]>
K
∑
k=1
∂wCk (θi)
∂θi
H(k)(RC(θi))
> H(k∗)(RC(θi))
K
∑
k=1
∂wCk (θi)
∂θi
= 0, (4.28)
where the last line follows from the first identity in (4.27). Since the derivative
is positive, Eθ−i,σ [xi j(θi, ·)] is increasing in θi.
For providers, allocation rule (4.23) yields
∂
∂σ j
Eθ ,σ− j [xi j(·,σ j)] =
∂
∂σ j
K
∑
k=1
wPk (σ j)
∫ θ¯
RP(σ j)
f(k)(r)dr
=
∂
∂σ j
K
∑
k=1
wPk (σ j)(1−F(k)(RP(σ j)))
=−
( K
∑
k=1
∂wPk (σ j)
∂σ j
F(k)(RP(σ j))
+
K
∑
k=1
wPk (σ j) f(k)(RP(σ j))R
′
P(σ j)
)
. (4.29)
Notice that RP(σ j) is increasing. Labeling the indices k as k∗ and using a sim-
ilar argument as above shows that the expression in the outer brackets in (4.29) is
always positive. Therefore, the whole term is negative, and thus Eθ ,σ− j [xi j(·,σ j)] is
decreasing in σ j. This proves that the monotonicity properties of Lemma 4.1 are
satisfied. In addition, the allocation rule also fulfills constraint (4.3) because the rule
is positive assortative as long as the difference between virtual valuation and virtual
cost is positive.
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The following theorem provides sufficient conditions for the TPAA mechanism
to maximize the expected social welfare among all incentive compatible and indi-
vidually rational mechanisms.
Theorem 4.1. Let customer ai’s valuation v(θi,σ j) be maximized at θi = σ j and
increasing in its maximum, supermodular, and concave in θi. Further, let
∂ 3v(θi,σ j)
∂θ 2i ∂σ j
≥ 0,
f (θi)
1−F(θi) ≥
∂
∂θi
log
(∂v(θi,σ j)
∂σ j
)
. (4.30)
On the supply side, let provider b j’s provision cost c(θi,σ j) be minimized at
σ j = θi and increasing in its minimum, submodular, and convex in σ j. Further, let
∂ 3c(θi,σ j)
∂θi∂σ2j
≤ 0,
h(σ j)
H(σ j)
≥ ∂
∂σ j
log
(∂c(θi,σ j)
∂θi
)
. (4.31)
Let the distribution functions F(·) and H(·) be log-concave. Then the TPAA
mechanism maximizes the expected social welfare among all incentive compatible
and individually rational mechanisms. Further, budget balance is satisfied.
Proof. The inner term of the maximand in (3.12) is the difference between ai’s val-
uation and b j’s cost. Because v(θi,σ j) is supermodular and c(θi,σ j) is submodular
(i.e., −c(θi,σ j) is supermodular), their difference as a linear combination is again
supermodular. If the production function is supermodular, the optimal match func-
tion is positively assortative (Shimer and Smith, 2000). By Lemma 4.1, the TPAA
mechanism is incentive compatible and individually rational if and only if the mono-
tonicity properties are satisfied. These are satisfied if the reserve functions RC(θi)
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and RP(σ j) are increasing. The hazard rate (4.30) for customers guarantees that a
higher desired quality θi unambiguously results in a better lottery over the offered
qualities of providers. Similarly, the hazard rate (4.31) on the provider side ensures
that a higher offered quality σ j unambiguously entails a lower likelihood to find a
customer. Therefore, the reserve functions are increasing. Lemma 4.2 establishes
budget balance.
The notions of supermodularity and submodularity used in Theoreom 4.1 re-
ceive the following interpretation. In economic theory, the supermodularity property
of a function represents the economic concept of complementary inputs (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1990). Loosely speaking, a function is supermodular if it has “increas-
ing differences” (Chambers and Echenique, 2009). In the light of Theoreom 4.1,
the marginal utility of a customer with desired quality θi increases in the offered
quality σ j of a provider. This interpretation is intuitive because customers obtain
higher utilities from matching with high-quality providers. The reverse explanation
applies to the submodularity of providers’ provision costs. For twice continuously
differentiable functions, the cross-partial derivatives of supermodular (submodular)
functions are non-negative (non-positive).
4.2.3 Numerical example
This section presents a numerical example to illustrate the design of second-best
mechanisms that satisfy incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget
balance. First, valuation and cost are defined based on the assumptions made in
Theoreom 4.1. Then, the relationship between each agent’s actual and virtual reser-
vation value is discussed. Finally, the example depicts the allocation boundaries of
the second-best mechanism in comparison to the associated first-best boundaries.
Suppose each customer’s desired quality θi and each provider’s offered quality
σ j are identically and uniformly distributed over the unit interval. All customers
have valuations of
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v(θi,σ j) = 1+
√
θi− (θi−σ j)2 (4.32)
and all providers have provision costs of
c(θi,σ j) = σ2j +(θi−σ j)2. (4.33)
These functions satisfy the requirements in Theorem 4.1. In particular, the valu-
ation v(θi,σ j) is supermodular because
∂ 2
∂θi∂σ j
v(θi,σ j) = 2≥ 0, (4.34)
and the provision cost c(θi,σ j) is submodular because
∂ 2
∂θi∂σ j
c(θi,σ j) =−2≤ 0. (4.35)
Since all private information is independently drawn from the uniform distribu-
tion, the densities are f (θi) = h(σ j) = 1, with cumulative distributions F(θi) = θi
and H(σ j) = σ j over the interval [0,1]. Given these functions, the virtual valuation
of customers evaluates to
ψC(θi,σ j) = v(θi,σ j)− (1−θi)(2σ j−2θi+ 12√θi
), (4.36)
while the virtual cost of providers is
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ψP(θi,σ j) = c(θi,σ j)+σ j(4σ j−2θi). (4.37)
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the relationship between actual and virtual reser-
vation values of the agents. The fact that a customer’s virtual valuation is less than
or equal to his actual valuation indicates that he will in general have an incentive to
understate his desired quality in order to favorably influence the transaction price.
The customer with the strongest incentive to understate his desired quality is the one
with the highest desired quality. However, since this customer will generate more
social welfare (i.e., gains from trade) than a customer with a low desired quality,
an efficient mechanism will match the highest quality customer with a provider of
a lower actual cost whenever doing so is efficient. Hence, the virtual valuation of
the highest quality customer is equal to his actual valuation. To ensure that this cus-
tomer reports his desired quality truthfully, the mechanism must make lower reports
unprofitable. It does so by lowering the probability that a customer with a lower
desired quality will be matched at a lower probability. This reduced probability is
inefficient, but the loss in social welfare is smaller from reducing the probability of
trade for customers with low desired qualities than with high desired qualities. The
reverse explanation applies to the pattern observed for providers. Hence, this exam-
ple illustrates what the revelation principle does: It embeds the strategic behavior of
the agents in the mechanism so that in equilibrium the agents no longer engage in
strategic misrepresentation.
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Figure 4.1: Actual and virtual valuation of customers.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
actual quality σ j
co
st
actual cost
virtual cost
Figure 4.2: Actual and virtual provision cost of providers.
The mechanism arranges an allocation if and only if the difference in virtual
valuation and virtual cost is non-negative. Figure 4.3 shows the boundaries of the
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first-best and second-best mechanism for the case of uniformly distributed qualities.
The shaded area in solid green contains the eligible quality pairs within the domain
[0,1]× [0,1] that warrant service allocation in the first-best mechanism. The dotted
region within the solid area contains all quality pairs that are allocated in the second-
best mechanism. The significantly smaller area in the second-best case illustrates
the distortion due to the presence of privately known qualities on either side of the
market.
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Figure 4.3: The shaded area (solid green) contains all eligible, uniformly distributed
quality pairs that warrant service allocation in the first-best mechanism. The dotted
area contains the corresponding quality pairs in the second-best mechanism.
Since the TPAA mechanism is positively assortative, it converges to deterministic
quantile matching (Johnson, 2011). Therefore, in the limit as K → ∞, the empiri-
cal quantile function is asymptotically equivalent to the k-th order statistic (van der
Vaart, 2000). This means that σ → H−1(F(θ)) in the allocation rule, and therefore
σ→ θ for uniformly distributed θ and σ on [0,1]. Hence, substituting σ = θ into the
allocation surplus yields v(θ ,θ)−c(θ ,θ) =√θ−θ 2+1, representing the expected
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match surplus generated by an allocation as K→ ∞ for uniformly distributed quali-
ties. Figure 4.4 shows this surplus, while the two dashed lines indicate the lower and
upper bound of the exclusion condition ψ(θ ,θ)≥ 0. Solving this inequality gives
the lower bound a = 0.1157 and the upper bound b = 0.7604 so that in the limit, all
qualities less than a and greater than b are not allocated by the mechanism.
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Figure 4.4: The solid curve shows the average allocation surplus for K→ ∞, while
only the quality pairs between the dashed lines are matched under the uniform
distribution.
For this rather simple example, the asymptotic efficiency of the second-best
mechanism can be calculated analytically. As discussed in Section 2.1.2.4, this ef-
ficiency is given by the ratio between the outcome of the second-best mechanism
and the outcome of the first-best mechanism if it were to exist. The outcome of the
second-best mechanism must consider the lower and upper bound of the exclusion
condition arising from incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
The outcome of the first-best mechanism is simply the average match surplus that
would be generated if all QoS information were publicly known. Therefore, the
asymptotic efficiency of the mechanism as K→ ∞ is given by
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∫ b
a
(
v(t, t)− c(t, t)
)
dt∫ 1
0
(
v(t, t)− c(t, t)
)
dt
≈ 0.6859, (4.38)
since f (t) = 1 for the uniform distribution. Thus, the TPAA mechanism’s ef-
ficiency for uniformly distributed qualities over the unit interval is 68.59%. The
experimental evaluation in Chapter 5 confirms this result (cf. convergence asymp-
tote in Figure 5.3).
Chapter 5
Experimental Evaluation
Test all things; hold fast what is good.
1 Thessalonians 5:21, The Bible
(New King James Version)
This chapter reports on the experimental evaluation of the allocation mechanism
for electronic services. The experimental evaluation was executed by simulation
with artificial data. This chapter presents the experimental setup used for the simula-
tion study, the results obtained through the simulation, and discusses the economic
insights that can be inferred from these results.
5.1 Simulation setup
The simulation study in this research compares the outcome of the second-best
mechanism to the one achieved by the associated first-best mechanism if it were to
exist (cf. Section 2.1.2.4). This study considers a set of experiments that vary in the
probability distribution of the private information as well as in the number of cus-
tomers and providers in the market. All experiments are executed by implementing
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the allocation algorithm using MATLAB (2015). This section describes the different
experiments and the allocation algorithm.
5.1.1 Experiments
The simulation study considers three distinct experiments executed by simulation
with artificial data. These experiments differ in the choice of the underlying probabil-
ity distributions for the QoS desired by customers and the QoS offered by providers.
The experiments include:
• Experiment 1 (symmetric, uniform): The QoS realizations desired by customers
and offered by providers in the market are independently drawn from the uniform
distribution over the unit interval [0,1]; that is, θi ∼ σ j ∼ U(0,1) for all ai,b j.
Thus, demand and supply are symmetric.
• Experiment 2 (symmetric, normal): The QoS values of customers and providers
are independently drawn from the normal distribution truncated to the unit interval
[0,1] with a mean of µ = 0.5 and a standard deviation of σ = 0.1; that is, θi ∼
σ j ∼ N(0.5,0.01) for all ai,b j. Again, demand and supply are symmetric.
• Experiment 3 (asymmetric, beta): Unlike Experiments 1 and 2, this experiment
assumes asymmetric demand and supply. The QoS desired by customers is in-
dependently drawn from the beta distribution with α = 3 and β = 2; that is,
θi ∼ Beta(3,2) for all ai. In contrast, the QoS realizations actually offered by
providers are independently drawn from the beta distribution with α = 1 and
β = 3; that is, σ j ∼ Beta(1,3) for all b j. On such markets, customers tend to
desire high QoS. The probability density function for Beta(3,2) has a local max-
imum at 2/3. That is, the relative likelihood of a customer to desire a QoS of
less than 2/3 increases monotonically. For QoS values above 2/3, however, the
relative likelihood decreases because customers anticipate higher prices for such
high-quality services. On the supply side, providers are more likely to offer low
CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 87
QoS since increased quality entails higher provision costs. Hence, the relative like-
lihood of providers to offer high QoS decreases monotonically. The probability
density functions of customers and providers are shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Density functions of beta-distributed customers and providers.
Because the simulation study evaluates the TPAA mechanism, it must be en-
sured that the conditions on the underlying probability distributions required in
Theorem 4.1 are satisfied. First, the uniform, normal, and beta distribution must be
log-concave. This requirement is fulfilled for all three distributions, given the param-
eters used in this study (Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 1989). Second, the hazard bounds
stated in inequalities (4.30) and (4.31) must be satisfied such that the mechanism’s
reserve functions defined in equation (4.18) are increasing. The second-best bound-
aries depicted in figures 4.3 (uniform), 5.11 (normal), and 5.12 (beta) show that the
reserve functions of both customers and providers are indeed increasing. Therefore,
Theorem 4.1 is applicable for the given parameter settings.
For assessing different market structures, each of the three experiments is ex-
ecuted in two particular settings, namely fixed and increasing. Setting 1 (fixed)
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assumes a fixed number of providers in the market, while the number of customers
increases. In this setting, there are 10, 50, and 100 providers that offer their services
to a growing number of customers. Setting 2 (increasing) reflects a market in which
the number of customers and the number of providers both increase at an equal rate.
Thus, the two settings include:
• Setting 1 (fixed): The number of providers is fixed to 10, 50, and 100.
• Setting 2 (increasing): The number of providers is increasing.
Table 5.1 provides an overview of all three experiments executed in this simula-
tion study.
Table 5.1: Experiments overview.
Experiment Num. of cust. N Num. of prov. M Distribution
1 increasing fixed uniform symmetric
increasing
2 increasing fixed normal symmetric
increasing
3 increasing fixed beta asymmetric
increasing
The deterministic and the random experiment parameters for the three experi-
ments are summarized in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. For every permutation of deterministic
and random parameters, an experiment instance is generated. Each experiment is
repeated 105 times and average values are calculated. For each repetition of the ex-
periment, the QoS desired by customers and the QoS offered by providers are freshly
and independently drawn from the respective probability distribution.
Table 5.2: Deterministic experiment parameters.
Parameter Range Distribution
Fixed N {2,4, . . . ,98,100} uniform, normal, and beta
M {10,50,100}
Increasing K = min{N,M} {10,50,100, . . . ,1000} uniform{10,20, . . . ,200} normal and beta
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Table 5.3: Random experiment parameters.
Probability distribution
Parameter Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Range
Customer desired QoS θi U(0,1) N(0.5,0.01) Beta(3,2) [0,1]
Provider offered QoS σ j U(0,1) N(0.5,0.01) Beta(1,3) [0,1]
The experimental setup is based on the setting used in the numerical example
presented in Section 4.2.3. Thus, the valuation function of each customer is given by
v(θi,σ j) = 1+
√
θi− (θi−σ j)2, (5.1)
and all providers have provision costs of
c(θi,σ j) = σ2j +(θi−σ j)2. (5.2)
As discussed in Section 4.2.3, these functions satisfy the requirements in Theo-
rem 4.1.
5.1.2 Algorithm
For the purpose of the simulation study, the following algorithm is implemented
using MATLAB (2015). The algorithm is repeated 105 times and average values are
calculated. The steps for each experiment are defined as follows:
1. Desired and offered quality realizations are drawn independently from the respec-
tive random distributions.
2. Desired and offered quality realizations are sorted positive assortatively.
3. The allocation surplus is calculated as v(θi,σ j)− c(θi,σ j).
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4. The allocation constraint is calculated as ψC(θi,σ j)−ψC(θi,σ j).
5. The sum of all allocation surpluses for the first-best mechanism (without con-
straint) as well as for the second-best mechanism (with constraint) are accumu-
lated.
6. The efficiency of the mechanism is calculated as the ratio between the mean
across all second-best outcomes and the mean across all first-best outcomes.
Algorithm 1 depicts the implementation of the TPAA mechanism in pseudo-
code. The input parameters of the algorithm are two vectors: the N-vector of all
customers’ desired quality values and the M-vector of all providers’ offered quality
values. Once both vectors are sorted in descending order, the algorithm calculates the
value of each allocation (i.e., the match surplus). If the surplus is non-negative, the
ex post welfare is incremented. Next, the constraint for incentive compatibility and
individual rationality derived in Lemma 4.1 is calculated. If it is non-negative, the
value for ex ante welfare is incremented. Finally, the efficiency of the mechanism is
calculated as the ratio between the second-best outcome and the first-best outcome.
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input :Customers’ desired quality vector θ = (θ1, . . . ,θN) and providers’
offered quality vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σM).
output :The efficiency of the mechanism.
welfareexpost← 0;
welfareexante← 0;
surplus← 0;
θ ← sortDescending(θ);
σ ← sortDescending(σ);
K←min{N,M};
;
for i← 1 to K do
surplus← v(θ(i),σ(i))− c(θ(i),σ(i));
if surplus > 0 then
welfareexpost← welfareexpost + surplus;
constraint← ψC(θ(i),σ(i))−ψP(θ(i),σ(i));
if constraint > 0 then
welfareexante← welfareexante+ surplus;
end
;
end
;
end
;
efficiency← welfareexante/welfareexpost
Algorithm 1: Direct mechanism implementation.
As discussed in Section 2.1.2.4, the algorithm calculates the outcomes for both
the first-best and the second-best mechanism. In the first-best case, the mechanism
assumes the existence of complete information and thus arranges an allocation if and
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only if a customer’s valuation exceeds a provider’s provision cost. Since complete
information is available to the agent, the mechanism does not need to consider the
incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. The expected social
welfare achieved by the first-best mechanism is then set as benchmark and compared
to the outcome produced by the second-best mechanism under private information.
Subsequently, the efficiency of the TPAA mechanism is computed as the ratio be-
tween the outcome of the first-best and the outcome of the second-best mechanism
for each permutation of deterministic parameters. Finally, this simulation study esti-
mates the behavior of the asymptotic efficiency for large markets.
5.2 Results
This section presents the results achieved by the simulation study. It reports the
results obtained in Experiment 1 with uniform, symmetrically distributed QoS, in
Experiment 2 with normally, symmetrically distributed QoS, and Experiment 3 with
asymmetric, beta-distributed QoS.
5.2.1 Uniformly distributed, symmetric quality
In the sections that follow, the QoS desired by customers and the QoS offered by
providers is drawn from the uniform probability distribution on the unit interval. All
agents are assumed to be symmetric. First, the results for a fixed number of providers
are presented, followed by the results for an increasing number of providers.
5.2.1.1 Fixed number of providers
Table 5.4 shows the results obtained by the TPAA mechanism for a market with
an increasing number of customers and the number of providers fixed to 10, 50,
and 100. All agents are symmetric uniform; that is, all QoS realizations are drawn
from the uniform distribution over the unit interval. The columns labeled “M = 10”,
“M = 50” and “M = 100” show the efficiency of the TPAA mechanism with 10, 50,
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and 100 providers, while the number of customers increased from 2 to 100. The
efficiency is the proportion of the ex ante expected social welfare relative to the
social welfare that an ex post efficient mechanism would achieve if it were to exist
(cf. Section 2.1.2.4).
Table 5.4: Efficiency of the TPAA mechanism for uniformly distributed QoS with
the number of providers fixed to 10, 50, and 100.
N = |AC| M = 10 M = 50 M = 100
2 0.1312 0.0001 0.0000
10 0.5921 0.0011 0.0000
20 0.8312 0.0139 0.0000
30 0.8450 0.0917 0.0001
40 0.8479 0.3371 0.0010
50 0.8477 0.6288 0.0071
60 0.8482 0.8085 0.0351
70 0.8473 0.8314 0.1237
80 0.8470 0.8419 0.2994
90 0.8464 0.8476 0.5045
100 0.8464 0.8508 0.6536
Figure 5.2 depicts the content of Table 5.4 graphically. It shows the average
behavior of the mechanism’s efficiency as a function of the number of customers for
uniformly distributed desired and offered QoS realizations. The number of providers
on the market is fixed to 10, 50, and 100. For 10 providers, the efficiency is at its
minimum of 0.1312, followed by an efficiency increase as the number of customers
grows. At about 60 customers, the efficiency reaches its maximum at 0.8482. Then,
the efficiency decreases at a very slow rate and arrives at 0.8464 for 100 customers.
Further experiments with larger numbers of customers (and fixed provider numbers)
show that the efficiency values scatter around the asymptote at 0.8397. This asymp-
totic efficiency of 0.8397 can be derived analytically as follows. When the number
of customers increases to infinity, the corresponding limit qualities that are matched
with providers’ qualities will converge to 1. This convergence property is due to
the fact that the TPAA mechanism arranges allocations positive assortatively with
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K =min{N,M} agents on either side of the market (cf. Section 4.2.3). Therefore, in
the limit with N→ ∞ and fixed M, the efficiency is given by
∫ b
a
(
v(1, t)− c(1, t)
)
dt∫ 1
0
(
v(1, t)− c(1, t)
)
dt
≈ 0.8397, (5.3)
where the density is f (t) = 1 for the uniform distribution. The bounds of integra-
tion a= 0 and b= 0.8571 are the solutions to ψC(1, t)−ψP(1, t) = 0. These bounds
reflect the exclusion boundaries of the second-best mechanism as depicted in the
right hand side of Figure 4.3. Hence, in the limit, all quality values of providers that
exceed b = 0.8571 are excluded by the mechanism.
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Figure 5.2: Efficiency of the TPAA mechanism with symmetric agents and QoS
realizations drawn from the uniform distribution over the unit interval with 10, 50,
and 100 providers.
When 50 providers offer their services to less than 20 customers, the efficiency
vanishes completely. For 20 to 70 customers the efficiency increases. For 80 and
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more customers, the efficiency exceeds the asymptote, reaching a maximum at
0.8508 for 100 customers. Similar to the experiment with 10 providers, further exper-
iments indicate that the efficiency for customer numbers beyond 100 scatters around
the asymptote at 0.8397. With 100 providers on the market, the efficiency is zero for
less than 50 customers. It then increases until the same limit of 0.8397 is reached
(not shown in the graph).
5.2.1.2 Increasing number of providers
Table 5.5 shows the efficiency of the TPAA mechanism when the number of cus-
tomers and the number of providers is increased equally. The column labeled
“Second-best welfare” contains the expected social welfare that the TPAA mech-
anism generates. The column labeled “First-best welfare” contains the expected
social welfare that the corresponding ex post efficient mechanism would achieve if
such a mechanism were to exist. The “Efficiency” column represents the proportion
of the expected social welfare that the ex ante efficient mechanism generates relative
to the expected social welfare that an ex post efficient mechanism would achieve
(column “Second-best welfare” divided by column “First-best welfare”).
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Table 5.5: Efficiency of the TPAA mechanism for uniformly distributed QoS when
the number of customers and the number of providers are increased equally.
K = min{N,M} Second-best welfare First-best welfare Efficiency
50 41.3419 65.9973 0.6264
100 86.6442 132.6719 0.6531
150 132.5587 199.3517 0.6649
200 178.4311 265.9973 0.6708
250 224.0339 332.6235 0.6735
300 270.0221 399.3313 0.6762
350 315.9203 466.0111 0.6779
400 361.5663 532.6608 0.6788
450 407.5797 599.3747 0.6800
500 453.1483 666.0127 0.6804
550 498.8646 732.6713 0.6809
600 544.6702 799.3493 0.6814
650 590.4833 866.0323 0.6818
700 636.1366 932.6922 0.6820
750 681.7975 999.3471 0.6822
800 727.6245 1066.0283 0.6826
850 773.0014 1132.6003 0.6825
900 818.9349 1199.3372 0.6828
950 865.0273 1266.0462 0.6833
1000 910.6372 1332.7073 0.6833
Figure 5.3 depicts the content of Table 5.5 graphically. It shows the mechanism’s
efficiency as the number of customer and the number of providers are increased
equally; that is, K =min{N,M} is increased to infinity. For N =M = 50 agents (first
data point), the efficiency has its lowest value at 0.6264. The curve then increases
monotonically and approaches the asymptote at 0.6859 from below. This asymptotic
efficiency of 0.6859 was derived analytically in formula (4.38).
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Figure 5.3: Asymptotic efficiency of the TPAA mechanism with symmetric agents
and QoS realizations taken from the uniform distribution over the unit interval as
K→ ∞.
5.2.2 Normally distributed, symmetric quality
This section provides the results obtained for a market, in which the QoS of cus-
tomers and providers is normally distributed on the unit interval. Again, all agents
are assumed to be symmetric.
5.2.2.1 Fixed number of providers
Table 5.6 shows the results obtained by the TPAA mechanism for a market with an
increasing number of customers and the number of providers fixed to 10, 50, and
100. All agents are symmetric normal. That is, the QoS desired by customers and
the QoS offered by providers are drawn from the normal distribution truncated to
the unit interval with mean of µ = 0.5 and standard deviation of σ = 0.1.
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Table 5.6: Efficiency of the TPAA mechanism for normally distributed QoS with
number of providers fixed to 10, 50, and 100.
N = |AC| M = 10 M = 50 M = 100
2 0.6337 0.0782 0.0059
10 0.9253 0.5849 0.1737
20 0.9595 0.8190 0.5899
30 0.9612 0.8807 0.7556
40 0.9619 0.9096 0.8214
50 0.9628 0.9311 0.8574
60 0.9628 0.9593 0.8807
70 0.9631 0.9600 0.8973
80 0.9639 0.9605 0.9100
90 0.9640 0.9610 0.9205
100 0.9645 0.9613 0.9316
The content of Table 5.6 is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.4. The QoS of
customer and providers are normally distributed. With 10 providers on the market,
the lowest efficiency is 0.6337 for two customers. As the number of customers
increases, the efficiency quickly increases and approaches the asymptote at 0.9735
for 10 or more customers. When 50 providers are on the market, the lowest efficiency
is 0.0782 for two customers. The efficiency then increases and also approaches
0.9735 for 50 or more customers. When 100 providers offer their services to two
customers, the efficiency is at its minimum of 0.0059. Like in the setting with 10
and 50 customers, the efficiency approaches 0.9735 for 100 customers (not shown
in the graph). Similar to formula (5.3), the asymptotic efficiency can be evaluated
analytically by
∫ b
a
(
v(1, t)− c(1, t)
)
f (t)dt∫ 1
0
(
v(1, t)− c(1, t)
)
f (t)dt
≈ 0.9735, (5.4)
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where f (t) = 1√
0.02pi
e−(t−0.5)2/0.02 is the density of the normal distribution and
a = 0 and b = 0.6967 are the solutions to ψC(1, t)−ψP(1, t) = 0.
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Figure 5.4: Efficiency of the TPAA mechanism with symmetric agents and QoS
realizations taken from the normal distribution truncated to the unit interval with 10,
50, and 100 providers.
5.2.2.2 Increasing number of providers
Table 5.7 shows the efficiency of the TPAA mechanism when the number of cus-
tomers and the number of providers are increased equally. All agents are symmetric
normal; that is, all QoS realizations follow the normal distribution with mean of
µ = 0.5 and standard deviation of σ = 0.1.
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Table 5.7: Efficiency of the TPAA mechanism for normally distributed QoS real-
izations when the number of customers and the number of providers are increased
equally.
K = min{N,M} Second-best welfare First-best welfare Efficiency
10 13.2836 14.3503 0.9257
20 26.7292 28.7758 0.9289
30 40.1778 43.2020 0.9300
40 53.6373 57.6384 0.9306
50 67.0896 72.0721 0.9309
60 80.5403 86.5001 0.9311
70 94.0065 100.9298 0.9314
80 107.4848 115.3731 0.9316
90 120.9242 129.8062 0.9316
100 134.3688 144.2362 0.9316
110 147.7988 158.6618 0.9315
120 161.2170 173.0916 0.9314
130 174.7190 187.5380 0.9316
140 188.1320 201.9665 0.9315
150 201.5995 216.3959 0.9316
160 215.0549 230.8396 0.9316
170 228.5259 245.2781 0.9317
180 241.9595 259.7124 0.9316
190 255.3934 274.1296 0.9317
200 268.8460 288.5723 0.9316
The mechanism’s efficiency as the number of customer and providers increases
equally is shown in Figure 5.5. Here, the number of customers and the number of
providers are increased at the same rate such that M =N always holds. For 10 agents
on each market side (first data point), the efficiency has its lowest value at 0.9257.
The curve then increases monotonically and approaches the asymptote at 0.9317.
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Figure 5.5: Asymptotic efficiency of the TPAA mechanism with symmetric agents
and QoS realizations taken from the normal distribution truncated to the unit interval
as K→ ∞.
Similar to formula (4.38), the asymptotic efficiency can be calculated as
∫ b
a
(
v(t, t)− c(t, t)
)
f (t)dt∫ 1
0
(
v(t, t)− c(t, t)
)
f (t)dt
≈ 0.9317, (5.5)
where f (t) is the density of the normal distribution, and a = 0.3065 and b =
0.6692 are the solutions to ψC(t, t)−ψP(t, t) = 0. Hence, in the limit market with
normally distributed QoS, the TPAA mechanism excludes any customer-provider
pair with QoS less than 0.3065 and greater than 0.6692. These exclusion lines are
depicted in Figure 5.6. Obviously, for symmetric customers and providers with nor-
mally distributed QoS, the exclusion lines surround the mean at 0.5 almost evenly.
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Figure 5.6: The solid curve shows the allocation surplus for K→ ∞, while only the
QoS pairs between the dashed lines are matched under the normal distribution.
5.2.3 Beta-distributed, asymmetric quality
This section presents the results generated by the mechanism when demand and
supply are asymmetrically beta-distributed. Like in the previous sections, the market
involves both a fixed and an increasing number of providers.
5.2.3.1 Fixed number of providers
In this experiment, the QoS desired by customers is drawn from the beta distribution
with α = 3 and β = 2, while the QoS offered by providers is drawn from the beta
distribution with α = 1 and β = 3. Table 5.8 shows the results obtained by the TPAA
mechanism for this asymmetric case.
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Table 5.8: Efficiency of the TPAA mechanism for beta-distributed QoS with number
of providers fixed to 10, 50, and 100.
N = |AC| M = 10 M = 50 M = 100
2 0.5106 0.0332 0.0012
10 0.8982 0.3842 0.0438
20 0.9352 0.7575 0.3461
30 0.9337 0.8513 0.6476
40 0.9317 0.8884 0.7681
50 0.9301 0.9083 0.8233
60 0.9295 0.9429 0.8549
70 0.9283 0.9419 0.8757
80 0.9279 0.9414 0.8902
90 0.9273 0.9403 0.9013
100 0.9267 0.9397 0.9097
The graphical representation of the content in Table 5.8 is shown in Figure 5.7.
The lowest efficiency of 0.5106 is obtained when 10 providers offer their services
to 2 customers. Once the number of customers increases to 20, the efficiency in-
creases drastically up to a value of 0.9352. For 30 and more customers, however, the
efficiency of the mechanism decreases at a very slow rate, reaching about 0.9267
when 100 customers demand services. A similar phenomenon can be observed for a
market with 50 providers. Starting with a very low efficiency of 0.0332, the maximal
efficiency of 0.9429 is obtained when 60 customers are in the market. Then, a small,
constant decrease in efficiency follows until 0.9397 is reached for 100 customers.
If 100 providers offer their services, the efficiency is monotone for the considered
range of customers.
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Figure 5.7: Efficiency of the TPAA mechanism with asymmetric agents and QoS
realizations taken from the beta distribution with 10, 50, and 100 providers.
For markets with a fixed number of providers and many customers, the asymp-
totic efficiency is computed analytically as follows. If a large number customers
desire services from a fixed number of providers, the QoS desired by customers
converges to 1. Therefore, the efficiency is given by
∫ b
a
(
v(1, t)− c(1, t)
)
f (t)dt∫ 1
0
(
v(1, t)− c(1, t)
)
f (t)dt
≈ 0.9111, (5.6)
where f (t) = 3(t−1)2 is the density of the beta distribution for providers with
α = 1 and β = 3. Similar to the previous experiments, a = 0 and b = 0.6376 are the
solutions toψC(1, t)−ψP(1, t)= 0. Therefore, in comparison to the efficiency values
shown in Table 5.8, the asymptote at 0.9111 is approached from above. Additional
experiments with larger numbers of customers confirm this phenomenon.
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5.2.3.2 Increasing number of providers
Table 5.9 shows the efficiency of the TPAA mechanism when the number of cus-
tomers and the number of providers are increased equally. In this case, customers are
providers are asymmetric. That is, customers desire their QoS according to the beta
distribution with α = 3 and β = 2. Hence, customers are more likely to desire high
quality services. In contrast, the QoS offered by providers is drawn from the beta
distribution with α = 1 and β = 3. Thus, providers are likely to offer low offered
quality because they anticipate lower provision cost (cf. Section 5.1).
Table 5.9: Efficiency of the TPAA mechanism for beta-distributed QoS realizations,
when the number of customers and the number of providers are increased equally.
K = min{N,M} Second-best welfare First-best welfare Efficiency
10 12.3967 13.8118 0.8975
20 25.2212 27.8721 0.9049
30 38.0437 41.9405 0.9071
40 50.8472 56.0192 0.9077
50 63.6848 70.0978 0.9085
60 76.5118 84.1616 0.9091
70 89.3304 98.2379 0.9093
80 102.1583 112.3244 0.9095
90 114.9787 126.3858 0.9097
100 127.7763 140.4655 0.9097
110 140.6281 154.5491 0.9099
120 153.4471 168.6043 0.9101
130 166.2508 182.6889 0.9100
140 179.1028 196.7532 0.9103
150 191.9128 210.8461 0.9102
160 204.7530 224.9219 0.9103
170 217.5585 238.9911 0.9103
180 230.3999 253.0731 0.9104
190 243.2257 267.1530 0.9104
200 256.0136 281.2237 0.9104
The contents of Table 5.9 are depicted graphically in Figure 5.8. When the
number of customers and the number of providers are increased at the same rate, the
mechanism’s efficiency is monotone throughout the complete range of QoS values.
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For N = M = 10 agents on each market side (first data point), the efficiency has
its lowest value at 0.8975. The curve then increases monotonically and reaches its
maximum at 0.9104 for 200 agents on either market side.
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Figure 5.8: Asymptotic efficiency of the TPAA mechanism with asymmetric agents
and QoS realizations taken from the beta distribution as K→ ∞.
To obtain an analytic expression for the asymptotic efficiency, the asymmetry of
customers and providers in this experiment must be considered. For this purpose,
it is necessary to calculate the allocation surplus in the limit market as K → ∞.
As discussed in Section 4.2.3, the TPAA mechanism converges to deterministic
quantile matching. In the limit as K→ ∞, the empirical quantile function is asymp-
totically equivalent to the k-th order statistic. Therefore, the expected QoS offered
by providers is a function of the two cumulative distributions F and H defined in
Section 3.2.1. That is, for any provider’s QoS in the limit market, σ → H−1(F(θ)).
Because the QoS desired by customers is beta-distributed with α = 3 and β = 2,
their cumulative distribution is F(θ) = (4− 3θ)θ 3. Similarly, the QoS offered by
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providers is H(σ) = (σ2−3σ+3)σ . Hence, inverting H and substituting σ = F(θ)
yields
H−1(F(θ)) = ((4−3θ)θ 3−1) 13 . (5.7)
Using this expression, the allocation surplus for the limit market is given by
v(θ ,H−1(F(θ)))− c(θ ,H−1(F(θ)))
=
√
θ −2
(
((4−3θ)θ 3−1) 13 − x+1
)2
−
(
((4−3θ)θ 3−1) 13 +1
)2
+1. (5.8)
Figure 5.9 depicts the allocation surplus displayed in equation (5.8) for large
markets as a function of the QoS θ desired by customers. The QoS of the associated
provider in that match is then given by σ = H−1(F(θ)). The shape of the curve
differs from the shapes observed for the uniform distribution (cf. Figure 4.4) and the
normal distribution (cf. Figure 5.6) in the number of local maxima. Unlike the latter
two graphs, the graph obtained for beta-distributed QoS shows two local maxima.
The first maximum emerges at a customer QoS of θ = 0.3663 with provider QoS of
σ = 0.05. The second maximum appears at θ = 0.8107 with σ = 0.4521. Thus, the
highest allocation surplus is generated when a customer with demand 0.8107 and a
provider with offer σ = 0.4521 are matched together in the limit market. Certainly,
the existence of two maxima reflects the asymmetry of customers and providers in
this setting (cf. discussion in Section 5.3.4).
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Figure 5.9: The solid curve shows the allocation surplus for K → ∞ as a function
of customer QoS, while only the desired QoS between the dashed lines is matched
under the beta distribution.
Similar to the experiments with uniform and normal QoS, the asymptotic effi-
ciency of the mechanism for beta-distributed QoS can be calculated analytically. The
ratio between the first-best and the second-best outcome is given by
∫ b
a
(
v(t,H−1(F(t)))− c(t,H−1(F(t)))
)
f (t)dt∫ 1
0
(
v(t,H−1(F(t)))− c(t,H−1(F(t)))
)
f (t)dt
≈ 0.9110, (5.9)
where f (t) = 12(1−t)t2 is the density function of the beta distribution for α = 3
and β = 2. The bounds of integration a = 0.2198 and b = 0.8950 are the solutions
to the exclusion condition ψC(t,H−1(F(t)))−ψP(t,H−1(F(t))) = 0. The efficiency
of 0.9110 derived in (5.9) is shown as the convergence asymptote in Figure 5.8.
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5.3 Discussion
This section discusses the insights that can be obtained from the results presented
in Section 5.2. Particular attention is paid to the fact that the asymptotic efficiency
of the TPAA mechanism is bounded away from 100% for each experiment. For this
purpose, the economic concept of each agent’s informational smallness is discussed
in detail. In conjunction with the informational smallness of the agents, the size of
each agent’s informational rent is of particular interest. Subsequently, this section
sheds light on the non-vanishing difference between a customer’s valuation and a
provider’s cost that is necessary for successful matching. Moreover, a number of
observations on the results obtained for the different probability distributions are
emphasized. Finally, this section discusses possible implementations of the TPAA
mechanism in dominant strategies.
5.3.1 Informational smallness of customers and providers
The results obtained in all experiments imply that although the mechanism’s asymp-
totic efficiency can be quite high, it is bounded away from 100%. This finding differs
significantly from the results described by other work in mechanism design theory.
Single-unit double auctions, for instance, achieve a socially optimal outcome in the
limit market under some assumptions (Wilson, 1985). Similar results hold for mul-
tilateral trading mechanisms. Unlike the bilateral trading mechanism proposed by
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), which is not ex post optimal, the multilateral
mechanism studied by Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) arrives at an asymptotic
efficiency of 100% for limit markets. They show that the market’s relative ineffi-
ciency is at most of the order logK/K2 for large K, where the number of customers
and the number of providers are increased at equal rates. Therefore, as K→ ∞, any
inefficiencies disappear.
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The mechanism studied in this research, however, indicates that the presence
of many customers and providers does not eliminate the mechanism’s inefficiency
caused by the asymmetry of information. The reason for this phenomenon is related
to the informational smallness of the agents. Loosely speaking, an agent is infor-
mationally small if the incremental impact of that agent’s private information (i.e.,
desired/offered QoS) on the demand of every electronic service is “small”, given the
information of other agents. The concept of informational smallness has been stud-
ied by Gul and Postlewaite (1992) in the context of replicated economies. McLean
and Postlewaite (2002, 2004) extend Gul and Postlewaite’s model to a more general
framework by providing a precise formalization of an agent’s informational size.
In principle, the asymptotic inefficiency observed for the TPAA mechanism
could disappear if certain conditions were satisfied. Gul and Postlewaite (1992) iden-
tify such conditions sufficient for eliminating inefficiencies in replicated economies.
However, for certain settings with asymmetric information, these conditions are
invalid. Therefore, the associated mechanisms cannot achieve full efficiency even
when the number of agents is large. One such example is the replication of the classic
bilateral trading mechanism studied by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), in which
only a specific match produces pairwise private surpluses. The two-trader case illus-
trates the impossibility of designing incentive compatible mechanisms that are ex
post efficient. In fact, the associated second-best mechanism reaches an efficiency
of 84.36% for uniformly distributed types (Gresik and Satterthwaite, 1983). If this
bilateral case were replicated with independent valuations across pairs such that only
specific matches generate mutual value, the inefficiency due to asymmetric infor-
mation might not vanish (Gul and Postlewaite, 1992). The presence of additional
pairs in the market would not impact the problem faced by any particular pair for
allocating the object between the two traders. This example demonstrates that even
in the presence of many agents (and consequently many objects), the asymptotic
efficiency of the mechanism may still be bounded away from 100%.
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The proposed model of the TPAA mechanism can be regarded as a specific
replication of the Myerson-Satterthwaite bilateral trading model. Surplus is produced
only if a specific pair of two agents is matched together. Only this particular agent
pair cares about the electronic service to be allocated. Adding more agent pairs to this
economy does not change the incremental impact of each agent’s private information
on the demand of the electronic service. Thus, the agents in the proposed model
are not informationally small even in large markets. In the model proposed in this
thesis, each provider offers a service of differentiated QoS, and each customer desires
a service of differentiated QoS. This feature prevent the agents from becoming
informationally small as the market becomes large. To this end, the absence of
informational smallness is the reason why the asymptotic inefficiency due to the
asymmetry of information does not disappear in the TPAA mechanism.
The numerical example discussed in Section 4.2.3 shows that the efficiency of
the TPAA mechanism for large markets is 68.59%, given uniformly distributed QoS
on the unit interval. This efficiency, however, is significantly lower than that of the bi-
lateral trading mechanism (84.36% as reported by Gresik and Satterthwaite (1983)).
If the latter economy were to be replicated, the number of commodities would ap-
proach infinity, while the agents’ valuations would still remain independent. This
research, however, focuses on a framework in which an agent’s utility depends upon
the types of all other agents. In particular, a customer’s utility is maximized when his
desired QoS matches the offered QoS delivered by a provider. Similarly, providers
maximize their utility by delivering exactly the QoS desired by customers. This
interdependence of the agents’ utilities causes the additional efficiency loss of over
15.77% as compared to the outcome found by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
This observation suggests that agents with interdependent utilities have greater in-
centives to misreport their QoS in order to win a better allocation than agents in the
(replicated) bilateral trading mechanism with independent valuations.
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5.3.2 Size of informational rents
Although the structure of the model proposed in this work differs from that of
McLean and Postlewaite (2002), their notion of an agent’s informational size can,
to some extent, still be applied to this model. In fact, the informational rent of an
agent quantifies the amount of compensation that must be paid to that agent to in-
duce honest reporting of their QoS. The agents’ informational rents are linked to
their informational size (McLean and Postlewaite, 2004). In this model, the agents’
informational rents are given by the second summand in the transfer functions (4.24)
and (4.25). For the case of asymmetric, beta-distributed QoS (cf. Experiment 3), the
informational rent S∞C (θ) of customers in the limit market is given by
S∞C (θ) =
∫ θ
0
∂
∂ t
v(t,H−1(F(t)))dt
= 2θ −θ 2+
√
θ −
(
θ 3(3θ −4)+1
) 1
3
(
2θ +(θ 3(3θ −4)+1) 13 −2
)
−1.
(5.10)
Similarly, the informational rent S∞P (σ) of providers is
S∞P (σ) =
∫ 1
σ
∂
∂ t
c(t,H−1(F(t)))dt
= 2σ −2σ2−
(
σ3(3σ −4)+1
) 1
3
(
2σ +(σ3(3σ −4)+1) 13 −2
)
. (5.11)
Hence, both quantities are bounded away from zero when the number of agents
becomes large on both market sides. Figure 5.10 depicts the informational rents of
customers and providers as functions of the QoS. This example with beta-distributed,
asymmetric QoS on [0,1] shows that the amount of compensation for honest report-
ing does not disappear even when the market size goes to infinity. In this sense, the
informational size of the agents does not not vanish for large markets.
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Figure 5.10: Informational rents of asymmetric customers and providers with beta-
distributed QoS in the limit market.
5.3.3 Non-vanishing difference in valuation and cost
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, the necessary condition for any two agents to match
in the limit market is ψ(θ ,θ) ≥ 0, when the agents use symmetric, uniformly dis-
tributed QoS. This difference in virtual reservation values required by the allocation
rule (4.23) does not vanish even when the number of traders is large. Based on the
parameters of the example in Section 4.2.3, inequality ψ(θ ,θ) ≥ 0 can be written
as
v(θ ,θ)− c(θ ,θ)≥ 2θ 2+ 1−θ
2
√
θ
> 0.7915. (5.12)
This difference in valuation and provision cost must be satisfied to warrant ser-
vice allocation in large markets. In particular, the right side of (5.12) is bounded
away from zero by 0.7915 for all θ ∈ (0,1] even when K→∞. In the asymptotically
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efficient mechanism proposed by Gresik and Satterthwaite (1983), the difference in
reservation values vanishes at the same rate as 1/2K approaches zero. Again, the
presence of this non-vanishing threshold (5.12) confirms that the TPAA mechanism
cannot attain full efficiency even when the number of traders is large.
5.3.4 Efficiency properties under different distributions
The mechanism’s efficiency properties arising in the three probability distributions
uniform, normal, and beta show a number of considerable distinctions. While the
asymptotic efficiency with symmetric, uniformly distributed QoS remains below
70% for equal number of agents on both market sides, the efficiency for symmetric
normal and asymmetric beta-distributed QoS exceeds 90%. The following para-
graphs discuss the issues that emanate from these observations.
5.3.4.1 Uniform distribution
The results obtained for symmetric agents with uniformly distributed QoS on the unit
interval show that the efficiency of the mechanism is non-monotonic when the num-
ber of providers is fixed. However, these non-monotonicities disappear once the num-
ber of customers becomes large because the efficiency converges to 0.8397. In par-
ticular, a market with 60 customers and 10 providers achieves the highest efficiency,
followed by a constant decrease towards the convergence asymptote. The economic
intuition behind this result is not sufficiently clear and requires further research. In-
terestingly, Muthoo and Mutuswami (2005) report on similar non-monotonicities
that occur in settings with discrete quality types. An economic explanation for this
phenomenon, however, is not provided.
In contrast to fixed provider numbers, there are no monotonicity issues when
the number of customers and providers are increased equally. In fact, the efficiency
values smoothly approach the asymptote from below. However, the asymptotic effi-
ciency remains quite low at 68.59%. With QoS uniformly scattered across the unit
CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 115
interval, there is more leeway for customers and providers to distort their true type.
Hence, it is comparatively expensive for the mechanism to implement incentive
compatibility.
5.3.4.2 Normal distribution
The results obtained in the setting with symmetric customers and providers and nor-
mally distributed QoS (mean of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.1) are different from
the uniform case. As in the uniform case, the asymptotic efficiency is also bounded
away from 100%. However, it is significantly higher than that for the uniform dis-
tribution. In the considered range of up to 100 customers, non-monotonicities in
efficiency do not arise for fixed numbers of providers. Yet this observation may not
apply for a higher number of customers. It is assumed that slight non-monotonicities
may also occur with normally distributed qualities. Further investigation concerning
these non-monotonicities, however, is out of the scope of this thesis and could be
the subject of future research.
For an equal number of agents on either market side, normally distributed QoS
entails an asymptotic efficiency of 93.15% as K→∞. When the QoS desired/offered
by the agents is drawn from the normal distribution, the associated realizations are
scattered around its mean of 0.5 with exclusion lines beyond the standard deviation
of ±0.1 (cf. Figure 5.6). In such situations, there is more mass in the center, which
means that the agents’ incentive to distort their QoS for receiving a better alloca-
tion is smaller. Figure 5.11 depicts this distortion due to the presence of private
information for symmetric agents whose QoS is drawn from the normal distribution.
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Figure 5.11: The shaded area (solid green) contains all eligible, normally distributed
QoS pairs that warrant service allocation in the first-best mechanism. The dotted
area contains the corresponding quality pairs in the second-best mechanism.
5.3.4.3 Beta distribution
Unlike Experiments 1 and 2, the third experiment considers asymmetric customers
and providers. This setting illustrates a market, in which customers tend to desire
high-quality QoS, and providers are more likely to offer low quality in order to re-
duce provision costs. The associated relative probabilities are shown in Figure 5.1.
Because the agents are asymmetric in their QoS, the boundary for successful match-
ing in the TPAA mechanism depicted in Figure 5.12 is not symmetric. For this
asymmetric, beta-distributed market, the expected QoS desired by customers is 0.6,
and the expected QoS offered by providers is 0.25. The same asymmetry appears in
Figure 5.9, where the allocation surplus in the limit market has two local maxima.
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Figure 5.12: The shaded area (solid green) contains all eligible, beta-distributed
QoS pairs that warrant service allocation in the first-best mechanism. The dotted
area contains the corresponding quality pairs in the second-best mechanism.
Similar to the case with uniformly distributed QoS, the efficiency of the mech-
anism exhibits non-monotonic behavior when the number of providers is fixed. If
10 providers are in the market, the decrease in efficiency starts already with 30 cus-
tomers (as opposed to 60 customers in the uniform case) and decreases by almost
1%. These differences may result from the asymmetry of customers and providers
in the beta-distributed case.
Although customers and providers are asymmetric with different expected QoS,
the asymptotic efficiency of the mechanism is still quite high at 91.10%. For
Beta(3,2), the QoS desired by customers is concentrated around θ = 2/3, which
is the maximum of the density function (cf. Section 5.1.1). To this end, a customer
is faced with higher competition because the QoS realizations of other customers
are clustered around 2/3. Therefore, customers are less incentivized to distort their
true desired QoS. On the supply side, a provider with decreasing density according
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to Beta(1,3) competes with other providers to offer low-quality services. Because
the mechanism lowers the probability that high-quality providers will be allocated,
a provider’s incentive to distort his offered QoS is small (cf. Section 4.2.3). As a
result, both customers and providers have little incentive to misrepresent their private
quality information. Thus, the mechanism’s efficiency is relatively high.
5.3.5 Implementation in dominant strategies
The proposed mechanism can also be implemented in dominant strategies with the
following considerations. In general, imposing incentive compatibility constraints
for dominant-strategy mechanisms instead of Bayesian mechanisms considerably
restricts the set of implementable mechanisms. However, Mookherjee and Reichel-
stein (1992) identify mechanism design problems for which Bayesian incentive
compatibility can be replaced by the more stringent requirement of dominant strat-
egy incentive compatibility without any losses. Since the allocation rule defined in
Theorem 4.1 satisfies the monotonicity conditions of Mookherjee and Reichelstein
(1992), there is no loss from replacing Bayesian equilibrium constraints with domi-
nant strategy requirements. Hence, the TPAA mechanism proposed in this research
is implementable in dominant strategies.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
Now all has been heard; here is the
conclusion of the matter: Fear God and
keep His commandments, for this is the
duty of all mankind.
Ecclesiastes 12:13, The Bible
(New International Version)
This chapter highlights the contributions and key findings obtained in this work
and outlines opportunities for future research.
6.1 Contributions
This research addresses the problem of service allocation under double-sided compe-
tition with private quality information. Using a mechanism design framework, this
work presents a mechanism for allocating electronic services with privately known
QoS and an analysis of its asymptotic efficiency properties. This thesis makes the
following two specific contributions to research in mechanism design theory.
First, this research adds to the literature by developing a double-sided mecha-
nism for the allocation of electronic services with private quality information from
a social welfare perspective. Prior research has mainly focused on the maximization
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of the intermediary’s profit (Che, 1993; Bichler and Kalagnanam, 2005; Johnson,
2013), whereas social welfare maximization subject to budget balance has heretofore
received little attention. Because marketplaces for electronic services must facilitate
distributed decision-making among the agents, budget-balanced mechanisms should
be investigated. Therefore, this research extends prior research that has solely fo-
cused on the optimal allocation rules from the perspective of a profit-maximizing
intermediary. This extension includes the design of the optimal mechanism from the
perspective of a social planner who attempts to maximize the expected social welfare
generated by the agents. Because private quality information is present in the anal-
ysis, this optimal mechanism is a second-best mechanism for allocating electronic
services. Specifically, the allocation mechanism is incentive compatible, individually
rational, and balances the budget.
Second, research on the efficiency properties of second-best allocation mecha-
nisms is still lacking and has only considered either identical objects (Gresik and
Satterthwaite, 1989; Rustichini et al., 1994) or discrete quality levels without deriv-
ing the optimal allocation rules and payments (Muthoo and Mutuswami, 2005, 2011).
This research fills this gap in the literature by studying the efficiency properties of
the second-best mechanism in three distinct simulation experiments. The first two
experiments consider a market with symmetric customers and providers. In these
experiments, the QoS of the agents is drawn from the uniform and the normal distri-
bution. The third experiment assumes asymmetric agents with beta-distributed QoS.
Throughout all experiments, this research finds that the asymptotic efficiency of the
mechanism is bounded away from 100% even when number of agents becomes large.
This finding is related to the economic concept of informational smallness, which is
defined as the incremental impact of an agent’s QoS on the demand of an electronic
service. In the proposed model, each provider offers a service of distinct QoS, and
each customer demands a service of distinct QoS. It is this feature of differentiated
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service quality that prevents the agents from becoming informationally small as the
market becomes large.
If each agent’s private information about QoS follows the uniform distribution,
the mechanism must tolerate an efficiency loss of more than 31% for an increasing
number of customers and providers. In contrast, if private quality information is nor-
mally distributed among agents, this research finds that the mechanism’s asymptotic
inefficiency due to the asymmetry of information can be reduced to about 7% as
the market size increases on both sides. With asymmetric, beta-distributed QoS, the
mechanism arrives at an asymptotic efficiency of more than 91%. These findings are
crucial to social planners because when designing service allocation with double-
sided competition, they can obtain an accurate estimation of potential efficiency
losses that arise from asymmetric information about QoS. Conversely, the social
planner can ensure that every allocation decision is made by the agents only. Hence,
the emerging distributed mechanism implementation circumvents the need for an
external, independent decision maker.
6.2 Future work
Future research might be pursued in two directions. First, in the current model, QoS
is restricted to a one-dimensional parameter. This limitation might be insufficient
for designing electronic service allocation with multiple QoS attributes. Thus, the
model could be extended to multi-attribute services by integrating scoring rules for
double-sided markets. This change would affect the optimality results and require
revisiting the model’s properties. Second, the model’s efficacy could be studied on
a greater scale to provide a more comprehensive quantitative evaluation. For this
purpose, the mechanism could be studied in simulation experiments with actual or
synthetic data that more realistically reflect markets for electronic services including
QoS and interdependent utility functions.
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